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SUMMARY 
 
The sealed-bid first-price auction is the commonly used for procurement auction of 
hospital medicines. The first hypothesis of this study is increased competition in the 
market lowers the medicines prices because there are several generic medicines and 
parallel imported medicines entering the market in addition to original medicines. The 
second hypothesis is repeated auction rounds are lowering the prices that are offered to 
hospital districts or pooled hospital districts because the tender prices from previous 
round will become publicly known before the next round tender pricing. There is no 
comprehensive study done in Finland on the effects of procurement auctions on hospital 
medicines prices.  
 
The game theory and closely related auction theory are applied in this study. One cen-
tral factor in procurement auctions is asymmetric information that has an impact on fu-
ture tender competition rounds. For this study the tender competition price data has 
been gathered from part of the hospital districts from five years. The data covers medi-
cines of antineoplastic and immunomodulating agents which costs have been growing 
faster than all other hospital medicines costs. The study hypotheses have been tested 
with multiple regression models. The conclusion of this study is that increased competi-
tion decreases the prices but repeated auction rounds do not have this effect. 
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
 
Sairaaloissa käytettävät lääkkeiden hankintahuutokauppana käytetään yleisesti suljettua 
tarjousta, ensimmäisen-hinnan huutokauppaa. Tämän työn ensimmäinen hypoteesi on, 
että lisääntynyt kilpailu markkinoilla laskee lääkkeiden hintoja, koska useammat rin-
nakkaislääkkeet ja rinnakkaistuodut lääkkeet tulevat markkinoille alkuperäislääkkeen 
rinnalle. Työn toinen hypoteesi on, että toistuvat huutokauppa-kierrokset alentavat sai-
raanhoitopiireille tai sairaanhoitopiirien yhdistelmille tarjottavia hintoja, koska edellisen 
kierroksen tarjoushinnat tulevat julkisesti nähtäville ennen seuraavan kierroksen tar-
joushinnoittelua. Hankintahuutokaupan vaikutuksesta sairaalalääkkeiden hintoihin ei ole 
tehty Suomessa yhtään kattavaa tutkimusta. 
 
Tutkimuksessa sovelletaan peliteoriaa ja siihen liittyvää huutokauppateoriaa. Yksi kes-
keinen piirre hankintahuutokaupassa on tiedon epäsymmetria, joka vaikuttaa tuleviin 
tarjouskilpailukierroksiin. Tutkimusta varten on kerätty osasta sairaanhoitopiirejä tar-
jouskilpailun hintatietoja viiden vuoden ajalta. Aineisto kattaa syöpä- ja immuunivas-
teen muuntajien lääkeryhmän, jonka kustannukset ovat kasvaneet nopeammin kuin 
kaikkien sairaalalääkkeiden kustannukset. Tutkimuksen hypoteeseja on testattu moni-
muuttuja-regressio – malleilla. Tutkimuksen lopputuloksena voidaan todeta että lisään-
tynyt kilpailu laskee hintoja mutta toistuvilla huutokauppakierroksilla ei tätä vaikutusta 
ole.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Medicines are a major part of costs accruing to hospitals in their task to provide health 
care for the population in Finland. The fact that these medicines are paid by tax reve-
nues increases the need for efficient purchasing. Auctions, as an application of game 
theory, are considered to be one of the most efficient ways of getting goods at competi-
tive prices. The sealed-bid first-price auction is the most commonly used method in Fin-
land for this purpose. The aim of this thesis is to study auctions as an application of re-
peated games, and how its application in pharmaceutical procurement auctions in Fin-
land’s hospitals affects price formation when there are several companies offering the 
same products for several consecutive times, for instance biannually. 
 
In brief,  
Hypothesis  1) increased competition is lowering the prices, 
Hypothesis  2) through these repeated auctions the prices are lower after each round. 
 
The Acts (government regulations) concerning public contracts regulates the way pro-
curement auctions have to be carried out. It should be in the interest of the government 
to follow up how this legislation is implemented, and what kind of effects it has had. 
Unfortunately, there are almost no studies of how increased competition with higher 
amount of available competing drugs, with the same active substance, affects the prices 
in procurement auctions in Finnish hospital setting in the long run. Studies showing the 
price changes in reference pricing system and generic substitutions can be found, but 
not many about price changes due to procurement of drugs.  
 
This study will show how the real purchase prices of drugs are affected (changed) by 
procurement auctions between the years of 2003-2007. This thesis is the first of its kind 
to  study where several repeated procurements, over several years, have been put to-
gether in order to see the overall financial effect over a longer period. The degree of 
competition of these drugs has been looked into and how it has affected in the prices: do 
increased numbers of available products on the market accelerate the pace of decreasing 
prices. The focus will be concerned with one drug group, antineoplastic and immuno-
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modulating agents, these are mainly used for treatment of cancers and rheumatoid arth-
ritis. 
 
2 BACKGROUND  
 
Organizing health care is a fundamental governmental and municipality function in Fin-
land, and it is mainly funded by a budget derived from the taxpayers’ money. In 2006, 
the total healthcare costs in Finland was 13.6 billion Euros, which was 8,2 % of the 
gross national product (GNP) (Finnish Statistics on Medicines 2007, 40). The hospital 
sector is one part of this healthcare system, and the implementation of it is the responsi-
bility of hospital districts created by a pool of municipalities. Hospital districts take care 
of all purchases of pharmaceutical products used in hospitals. This task is one of the 
most important tasks of hospital pharmacies, from a financial point of view. Currently, 
purchasing pharmaceuticals go through sealed-bid first-price procurement auctions 
which are assumed to give hospital districts rebates that will substantially lower the pur-
chase prices of different drugs. Normally, the auction is only concerned with products 
that have valid marketing authorization in this country, this is granted by the Finnish 
Medicines Agency (former National Agency of Medicines in Finland) or by the Euro-
pean Medicines Agency. The procurement auction is directed by the law, Act on public 
contracts 348/2007, and assumed to be followed accordingly. What needs to be remem-
bered is this does not force private hospitals, which are very few, to purchase drugs 
through auctions, but many of them complete purchases in a quite similar way in the 
hope of lowering the prices.  
 
Throughout the years, the Act on public contracts has been changed and currently there 
are clear directions on how to design the criteria for choosing one product over the oth-
er. While the most important criteria in practice is price, it is assumed that this price 
competition has partly affected  the increase of pharmaceutical companies represented 
in Finland, especially companies manufacturing generic drugs. Through this increased 
competition it is assumed that prices will decrease from the starting price level that has 
been determined by the originator’s price level. There is no research based evidence of 
this, but the total numbers of products (trade names) have increased through increased 
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number of generic products on the market as well as through new products (new sub-
stances) entering the market.  
 
In the group of antineoplastic and immunomodulating agents, the numbers of products 
with marketing authorization by trade names during 2003-2007, have increased from 
156 products in 2003 to 240 products in 2007. In the same period there were substances 
that entered the market and exited the market (Finnish Statistics on Medicines 2003, 
137-145; 2004, 139-147; 2005, 120-127; 2006, 120-127; 2007, 124-132). In the Table 
1, these figures are shown year by year. 
 
Table 1. Trade names in the pharmaceutical market 
year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
trade names with MA* 156 160 170 194 240 
new substances entering the 
market   3 8 3 5 
substances exiting the market   2 3   2 
* MA= marketing authorization 
 
2.1 Value of pharmaceutical market in monetary terms 
 
Thinking of the health sector as a whole, the discussion that has been circulating the 
most has been the prices of drugs and this has received the most publicity. While our 
population is getting older, the demand for treatment of chronic diseases will apparently 
continue for longer time. A considerable part of that treatment is given as medicines and 
thus it is a major factor in the total costs of health care. It has an impact on the competi-
tion and further on the prices of the medicines. Simultaneously, pharmaceutical compa-
nies, universities, and biotechnological companies are seeking new molecules in order 
to create new medicines which usually enter the market with higher prices than before. 
This has also impacted on the Finnish pharmaceutical markets.  
 
If we look at the total sales of prescription based pharmaceuticals in Finland from 2001 
to 2007 in Figure 1, an increase in the amount of money spent on drugs can be clearly 
seen. There is slight decrease in 2006 compared to the previous year but the trend has 
been upwards. At the same time, we can see the continuous increase in hospital sales, 
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but what needs to be pointed out, is that the hospital sales figures are wholesale prices 
without any rebates due to auctions. In Figure 1, there is also hospital sale with VAT 
(value added tax) that has been 8 % for drugs during 2001-2007. The sales to hospitals 
was 13,75 % of total sales of pharmaceuticals in 2001 and the share has increased al-
most each year and was 16,05 % in year 2006 and 16,32 % in 2007. All actual numbers 
related to Figure 1 can be seen in Appendix 1. 
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Figure 1. Total sales of pharmaceuticals and share of sales to hospitals 
 
In Figure 2, there are the percentages of change compared to previous years. It can be 
clearly seen, that while the change percentage in total sales of prescription based phar-
maceuticals has decreased, the annual increase in hospital sales has remained quite high 
throughout these years. It is clearly higher than the total increase of prescription based 
pharmaceuticals sales. The actual percentages in Figure 2 can be seen in Appendix 1. 
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Figure 2. Annual growth percentage compared to previous year for total sales of pharmaceuti-
cals and hospital sales 
 
Drug prices are regulated by the government partly through generic substitution, leading 
to increased competition, and through a price regulation mechanism. This mechanism 
requires pharmaceutical companies to apply for price and reimbursement if companies 
want to include their product into social insurance system. There are no price regula-
tions for drugs that are solely used in hospital settings. When the hospital is the buyer 
the only regulation form, is the budget constraints the hospitals have. Therefore, in re-
ality almost all drugs used in hospitals are bought through a sealed-bid first-price auc-
tion, which means in practice that these figures shown here for hospital sales in Figures 
1 and 2 are higher than they actually are. These total sales figures are according to offi-
cial wholesale prices for hospitals, and official retail prices for private pharmacies. This 
difference is based on the statistical system in use. It gives only the official wholesale 
prices for statistical purposes, and does not give the real purchase prices at all. But how 
much higher are these figures, it is unknown because there is no comprehensive study 
done to investigate this, nor is there collective statistics available showing the real pur-
chase prices in hospitals.  
 
In Finland, there is one study available that has been carried out for one procurement 
pool which covers the northern part of country. In this study Hirsso et al. (2006) have 
surveyed what kind of benefits co-operation between hospital districts, in the form of 
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increasing the size of pooled hospital districts, has given to the procurement of drugs 
and their price level. According to the survey, the price level of drugs decreased by 5 % 
from procurement period 2002-2004 to 2005-2007 (Hirsso et al. 2006, 743). Hospital 
districts have not published any data that would show the real purchase prices, and their 
effect on the total cost of pharmaceuticals for the public review.  
 
2.2 Legal aspects of procurement auction in Finland 
 
There are basically two different Acts simultaneously applied for procurement auctions 
in Finland. The first one is the “Act on public contracts” and the second one is the “Act 
on the Openness of Government Activities”. 
 
The European Parliament has written a directive 2004/18/EY which has been the basis 
for Finnish legislation on public procurements. The first Act was written into national 
legislation in Finland in 1992 and it has just recently been renewed. This came into ef-
fect in spring 2007, and it can be found from public internet sources. “Act on public 
contracts” (www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2007) clearly defines what kind of pur-
chases are under this law, what principles have to be applied, and the publicity of deci-
sions that will be made. Based on this Act, all participants in auctions should be treated 
equally without discriminating against any participant acting inside the European Un-
ion. It also demands that all decisions have to be transparent and public. Even though 
this applies and the decisions are in fact public, it is not easy to gain access to these for 
study purposes.  
 
The Act on the Openness of Government Activities 
(www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1999) states the procedures for how officials have to 
act in their duties and how the documents they handle are to be treated in a transparent 
manner. It also states that all procurement documents are free for public viewing, ex-
cluding documents that are specified to be hold secrets such as documents for defense 
procurement, or documents that are including bidders’ information concerning technical 
solutions that could be thought of as business secrets. Based on this Act, prices that 
have been offered in bids are not information that should be hold from public review. It 
is often separately stated in bids that prices are not considered as business secrecy.  
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Based on these two Acts all decision documents including the price information are free 
for public review after the contracts are sign between the suppliers and the buyers. 
 
3 GAME THEORY 
 
A very short and comprehensive description of game theory has been given by Don 
Ross (2010, p.1). He states: “Game theory is the study of the ways in which strategic 
interactions among economic agents produce outcomes with respect to the preferences 
(or utilities) of those agents, where the outcomes in question might have been intended 
by none of the agents.” This shows the unpredictability of end result between players 
especially with incomplete information. As the name indicates this is a game between 
parties. In order to succeed each player needs to be aware of the rules of the game.  
 
The auctions that are considered as games can be of a different variety. It can be either 
one-stage or an n-stage game which are also called as repeated game (Jofre-Bonet et al. 
2003, 1444) and include two or more players. Consequently, the game is characterized 
by the number of players involved in the game as well as the number of stages (Douma 
2002, 70). In a one-stage game, the game has only one round whilst in a two-stage game 
the game has two rounds. Typical one-stage games are co-ordination games with two 
players and auctions with more than two players. In co-ordination games players are 
trying to reach the best solution by co-ordinating their game in order to get best pay-offs 
for both players (Douma 2002, 71). The auctions involve more than two players. In 
open auctions each player knows the other players private valuation for auctioned items, 
and can decide when to stop bidding, in the case of ascending auctions like English auc-
tion or when to bid for the item in the case of descending auction like Dutch auction 
(Douma 2002, 79-80). In sealed-bid auctions, all bidders are leaving their bids in sealed 
envelopes at the same time, and no bidder has the knowledge of what the other players 
are bidding. This uncertainty or asymmetric information is a very important factor char-
acterizing the sealed-bid auction process. There is only one chance to win and the win-
ning of the item is completely based on the player's best estimate of what the others 
players are bidding and being able to beat that bid (Douma 2002, 81). 
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The n-stage game with two players is an entry game where possible entrants into the 
market are  estimating its possibilities and potential pay-offs by investigating current 
market structure and current players'  in the market. After a thorough investigation the 
entrant makes the decision to either enter the market or not depending on the potential 
profits it could achieve after entrance (Douma 2002, 75-78). The n-stage game with 
more than two players is called the iterated prisoner’s dilemma where the players have 
to make new decisions after each round of the game. After each round they know what 
the others have decided in the last round, but they do not have the information of what 
the others are going to decide for the next round, so the game goes on with surrounding 
uncertainty of others´ decisions. The one who can best estimate what the others are do-
ing is likely to be the winner of the final game (Douma 2002, 87-91).  
 
The distinction between games can also be made through the system of how the game is 
played. It can be played simultaneously or sequentially. The difference between these 
two are that in a simultaneous game the players do not know what the other players are 
doing and the bids are left simultaneously. In sequential game, the players can predict 
their moves according to what the others have done and the game is played in sequences 
(Douma 2002, 71).  
 
3.1 Players in the pharmaceutical market 
 
In every market there are at least two players. To make any exchange between goods or 
services, there needs to be at least one buyer and one seller. In addition, the prevailing 
assumption is that the buyer is willing to buy and the seller is willing to sell. The ex-
change will happen when the buyer buys what the seller sells. It also demands that there 
is some value for the trade to happen. Subsequently, in the analysis it is thought that all 
goods and services are valued in monetary terms. That is important for a comparison 
between goods and services in transparent way. 
 
Within the pharmaceutical market in Finland it can be said that there are three main 
players: buyers, sellers, and the parties delivering the goods. The induced demand of 
pharmaceuticals which cause buyers (hospitals) to buy from sellers (pharmaceutical 
companies), makes these two, the key players. Due to the delivery system in Finland, 
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wholesalers deliver most goods, stock the products, take orders from buyers, deliver the 
orders accordingly, and invoice the orders, the wholesalers can be considered as impor-
tant players. The drug companies have different kind of agreements with the wholesal-
ers. The wholesalers in turn, define delivery fees for buyers that drug companies, being 
the sellers, cannot affect. The more players there are, the higher the intensity of compe-
tition there will be. With only one seller, the price of the goods would follow the mo-
nopoly pricing giving little choice for the buyer. With only one buyer and several sell-
ers, the buyer has monopsony situation where sellers have to sell with lower margins, 
and some might even sell below marginal cost even though there is no evidence of that 
so far. Consequently, to find that kind of evidence is impossible due to the fact that drug 
companies do not publish any of their cost structures. The only assumption that can be 
made is that being a rational company, each company is acting in a profitable manner. 
 
3.1.1 Demand side players 
 
There are several different types of buyers determined by size. In the public sector, uni-
versity hospital pharmacies are the biggest buyers in Finland followed by central hospi-
tal pharmacies, regional hospital pharmacies and health centres pharmacies. Buyers in 
the private sector are private hospitals and private pharmacies. The size of the buyer 
gives relative negotiation powers; the bigger the buyer the more benefit it gets. This has 
led to the creation of pooling hospital districts into larger groups. These groups have 
made pooled procurement decisions in a similar way like in New Zealand, Canada, the 
United States and Norway (Tordoff et al. 2008, 1215). The pooling of hospital districts, 
for procurement auction purposes, has been increasing since the 2000.  In 2003, there 
were only two hospital districts pooled for procurement auctions and all the others, 19 
including the island of Ahvenanmaa, were doing it on their own, creating a total of 20 
procurement auctions.  Within five years, the pooling has increased and in 2007 there 
were a total of 13 procurements of pharmaceuticals, a decrease of 35 % (Appendix 2).  
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3.1.2 Supply side players 
 
There are plenty of international pharmaceutical companies operating in Finland. Each 
company has its’ own raw material supply, and manufacturing plants for medicines, 
with varying cost structures the profit they get from revenues differs greatly  and there-
fore cannot be traced. Here we can assume that after bidding for procurement, the com-
pany will still receive profit from their revenues after deduction of costs. Otherwise, it 
would not be worth at all to submit a tender. Unless the strategic aim of the company 
would be to eliminate other companies by reducing the profit to such an extent that the 
other competitors will leave the process, thereby giving the company a monopoly. Sub-
sequently, the price of the product will increase and eventually end up at the starting 
(original) level and use a monopoly pricing. Unfortunately, there are no studies avail-
able to show if that would be true in pharmaceutical markets. 
 
The procurement system in Finland gives companies two options with the end result of 
bid; either they win it or they lose it. The probability of winning decreases as the num-
ber of competitors increases. Each round (year) the game is gambling in order to be able 
to figure out how much the price level will decrease from the previous year’s prices and 
how many competitors are actually tending an offer for contract.  
 
4 AUCTIONS 
 
The word “auction” comes from language of Latin, it is derived from word “augere”, 
which means “to increase” (McAfee et al 1987, 702). Auction is defined as a method of 
sale, in which goods are sold in public to the highest bidder (A Dictionary of Business 
1996, 36). It can also be defined as a market institution with an explicit set of rules de-
termining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the market partici-
pants (McAfee et al 1987, 701). Or even more clearly, as a market clearing mechanism 
to equate demand and supply (Menezes et al 2004, 9). Overall, these definitions are ex-
plaining auction as a method of selling/buying goods and services in a manner where 
highest/lowest bid wins. 
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Auctions are an application of game theory. They are based on a game between players. 
In an open auction all players have full information on the other players' bids and can 
decide their moves based on this information flow. There is no uncertainty complicating 
the decision of price. In sealed-bid auctions players do not know what the other players 
are bidding, so the game is full of uncertainty. The lack of information creates a situa-
tion where players have to rely on their best estimations of what the others would bid. 
The one dealing best with uncertainty and playing its game better than the others will be 
the winner of the auction.  
 
The auction is one form of trading goods and services. There have been auctions for 
several hundred years. The slave trade of 16
th
 -18
th
 century were conducted through the 
mechanism of the open auction where many plantation agents vied for the best slaves. 
Art work, fruit, coffee and other raw materials have also been auctioned. Nowadays, 
auctions have spread into many other fields like UMTS-permissions, TV-channel rights, 
school milk, and variety of goods bought or sold by publicly owned entities. (McAfee 
1987, 701; Klemperer 2006, 151; Porter 1999, 263) One of these entities is hospital 
pharmacies, which buy the pharmaceuticals through sealed-bid auctions (Hirsso 2006, 
741). 
 
The basic function of an auction is to enable the trade of goods or services between two 
opposite parties. In auctions there are usually one auctioneer, and n number of bidders 
bidding for item i. These two parties are seller/sellers and buyer/buyers. Depending on 
the type of auction, one party has dominance over the other by being able to define the 
rules of the auction. The auctioneer decides the set up of the auction, how it will be exe-
cuted. Then the opposite party decides whether to participate in the auction or not. If in 
one auction there are no participants from the opposite side, the one defining the rules 
has two options: either change the rules or give up the auction.  
 
The basic goal for any seller in auctions is to sell the goods at the best possible price 
and terms, and to receive enough profits to enable them to operate at a profit. The sell-
ers’ main interest is of course to get as many competing companies or persons as possi-
ble to compete for the item on sale. For the buyers the main interest is cost minimiza-
tion, so they do their utmost to drive purchase prices as down (Varian 2006, 313). And 
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to receive the item on sale with best possible terms and price in order to lower the 
money they need for this particular investment. 
 
There are several studies concerning different auctions. Porter and Zona (1999, 263-
288) studied the Ohio school milk market, Tukiainen (2008, 25-54) has studied City of 
Helsinki Bus Transit auctions and Klemperer (2006, 192-206) has studied European 3G 
telecom auctions. There are no studies to be found that have studied the procurement 
auctions of prescription medicines in the long run. Some studies have highlighted the 
drugs and their prices to see how the costs have changed from one auction to another. 
Tordoff et al. (2008, 1214-1226) have studied the impact on pharmaceutical expendi-
tures in New Zealand's public hospitals. They compared the expenditures from 2003-
2004 to 2005-2006. In conclusion, they state that there had been a moderate impact on 
prices and savings were received. Hirsso et al (2006: 743) discovered in their study that 
partly by extending the procurement pool and partly due to generic substitution the total 
cost of pharmaceuticals decreased by 5 % in tender period 2005-2007 compared to 
2002-2004. Guo and Kelton (2004, 280-281) have studied Ohio Medicaid anti-ulcer 
gastric medications costs and found in their study that increased competition in generic 
drugs leads to decreased prices of generic drugs and reduced market share of the 
branded drug. In the Handbook of Pharmaceutical Public Policy (2007, 406-407), Guo 
and Kelton refer to Dusing et al. study where hospital buyer received approximately 46 
% discount from official prices in the anti-infective market.  
 
4.1 Value of auctions 
 
Auctions can be divided according to the value they create for the purchaser. Usually, 
auctions are divided into private value or public value auction. Private value is consid-
ered as a value that is known by the purchaser, and there can be significant variation 
between purchasers. One might value a forest as being extremely high, well above its 
market value while the other values the forest according to market value, what can be 
gained after selling it. This private value can differ significantly between buyers. 
 
Public value can be thought of as what benefits this same forest would give to the public 
for instance, a place of relaxing, well kept habitat having variety of animals or as a place 
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that has to be reserved for peoples´ hobbies like skiing, walking or worth preserving for 
the future. Public value is not always easy to calculate. It can reflect the society’s values 
as a whole, or it can be a reflection of some members of community and their private 
values. 
 
Drugs used in hospitals can be seen both as public value and private value creators. 
Public value could be seen as giving everyone the same possibility of receiving the best 
treatment with best available medicines, regardless of cost. On the other hand, some 
medicines are more expensive than others and that can create private value for those 
who receive these more expensive medicines, while tax payers are paying for those. 
There are also differences between hospitals and as to which medicines they use. (Phlips 
1988, 90, 105-106.) 
 
4.2 Types of auctions  
 
There are basically two different forms of auctions that need to be explained, open auc-
tions and sealed-bid auctions (Douma et al 2002, 79). These two forms are self explana-
tory. Open auctions are often used for selling art, fresh goods or even houses. Basically 
open auction can be used for selling anything that does not need the price to be kept 
secret. In open auctions, the auctioneer is leading the trade and setting the rules on how 
auction is going to proceed. The auctioneer also has the power to either to accept or to 
reject the offered price, and finally the auctioneer has the power to decide when to ac-
cept the final bid, effectively closing the auction.  In open auctions, all participants can 
observe the other players bids. 
 
Sealed-bid auctions, also known as procurement auctions, can be used for auctions 
where the price or any other features of the item should be kept secret until the decision 
has been made. It is also useful in situations where the equality of participants to auc-
tion is essential. In sealed-bid auctions, all players leave their bids in sealed envelopes 
at the same time, this means that there is only one chance to place the bid under the cir-
cumstance of lack of information of what the other players offers (Douma et al 2002, 
81). Participants usually know when the sealed envelopes are opened. In sealed-bid auc-
tions, the uncertainty factor is high throughout the process. In sealed-bid auctions the 
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highest bid will win. In procurement auctions, where sealed-bid auction is the basis for 
getting procurement, it is often the lowest bid that wins. The procurement auctions are 
often used in governmental or community bidding, like buying milk in state of Ohio in 
the USA. In Ohio, the school districts officials are soliciting bids on an annual basis for 
the supply contracts of milk to schools in specific school districts (Porter et. al 1999). It 
can also be seen that most often the procurement auction is used by institutions, where 
the final bill is to be paid by taxpayers´ money and therefore are under the control of 
society. The people responsible for soliciting the tender are also responsible for their 
actions to community as a whole. 
 
The procurement auction is a reversed auction in the sense that the same principals are 
applied as with any auction, but instead of the highest price winning it is the lowest 
price which is wins. Especially in the case of first-price sealed-bid auctions are often 
used for the tendering of government procurement contracts in which the government is 
the buyer and the sellers are competing for lowest price to win (McAfee et al 1987, 
702).  
 
Auctions can also be differentiated according to the type of auction. Varian (2006, 312) 
classifies different auctions according to the nature of the goods to be auctioned and 
according to the rules of bidding. In auctions there are normally seller(s) and buyer(s), 
but depending on the auction type, the format of their positions may be turned around. 
McAfee et al (1987, 702) have divided auction types into the English, the Dutch, the 
first-price sealed-bid, and the second-price sealed-bid auction. 
 
The English auction is probably the most well-known form of auction within the public 
sphere. In this auction type, which is also called open, oral or ascending-bid auction, the 
price is successively raised until only one bidder remains (McAfee et al 1987, 702). 
Usually there is one auctioneer, who announces prices, and players are aware of the 
price all the time, therefore they have full information and can bid accordingly. Subse-
quently, in practice there may be several players simultaneously bidding for one item, 
and the one who bids highest gets it. The English auction is often used for selling art.  
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The advantage with the English auction is that the players get the information simulta-
neously. In cases where there is more than one player who values the item in question 
highly, the selling price may rise far above the starting price and the seller of the item 
may earn far more than originally expected.  The disadvantage is that there may be a 
situation where there are not enough interested buyers for the item; consequently, the 
item could remain unsold due to this lack of interest. Alternatively, the item could be 
sold for below its´ real market value, and the seller will lose. There is also the possibil-
ity that auctioneer has put a reserve price on the item in which case if the reserve is not 
met the  item remains with its current owner. 
 
The Dutch auction works in the opposite way as the English auction. In the Dutch or 
descending auctions, the auctioneer has priced the item price on behalf of the seller (the 
auctioneer usually acts as an agent for the seller of the item) at a high level. He then 
reduces the price until one of the buyers makes an offer to buy it by calling “mine” 
(McAfee et al 1987, 702). The Dutch auction has been also defined as an auction sale in 
which the auctioneer starts by calling a very high price and reduces it until a bid is re-
ceived (A Dictionary of Business 1996, 174). In Dutch auctions the participants do not 
know what the other participants have in their mind and how much each of the partici-
pants is willing to bid. So the player has to bid without any information of what others 
might be willing to bid (Douma et al 2002, 80). The final result may be that the one 
wanting to buy the item bids higher than they would have needed if they had the infor-
mation of the prices as in English auction. Dutch auctions are often used for selling 
fresh items, like fish in Israel or cut flowers in Netherlands (McAfee et al 1987, 702). 
 
Dutch auctions may give substantial benefits to the seller or in the worst case leave 
items unsold. With fresh items like fish, flowers, or vegetables it might be in the interest 
of the seller to sell for lower price than leave the items unsold. In that way the seller can 
compensate at least some of the costs arising from producing the items for sale.  
 
The first-price sealed-bid auction, as the name indicates is a normal sealed-bid auction 
where the first-price, being the highest or lowest (as in many procurement auctions) will 
always win. The second-price sealed-bid auction follows the same idea as first-price 
sealed-bid auction with the distinction that the second best price is the winning price. 
Therefore, the winner of the auction is the one which has offered the highest (or lowest) 
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price but the winner is paying for the price that was second highest (or lowest). From 
the buyer’s point of view this gives the advantage of getting the item for a lower price 
than he was willing to offer by himself. From the seller’s point of view the selling price 
will be lower than it could have been. 
 
4.3 Che’s designed model 
 
When the auction is considered to include more factors than only price, we can use 
Che´s designed model for multidimensional auction (Che 1993, 670). With pharmaceu-
ticals the most convenient model is a two-dimensional model where price (p) is one 
factor and quality (q) is another factor. In this model companies are bidding on both 
quality and price. With drugs the quality can be seen as constant factor based on the 
assumption that when a product has been granted marketing authorization by the Medi-
cines Agency, it has to fulfil certain criteria on efficacy and safety for human use. This 
leads to a situation where the actual price is determined by the end result of the bidding 
game.  
 
Coming from this model (Che, 1993, 670) the buyer (hospital district or pool of hospital 
districts) derives utility from a contract, 
 
  U ( q, p ) = V ( q ) – p 
 
and a company while winning the contract can earn profits, 
 
  Πi (q, p ) = p – c ( q, Өi ) 
 
where Ө stands for marginal costs. 
 
With drugs auctions the scoring rule is set by the buyer and it is assumed to be publicly 
known to firms before they submit their bids as is the case in Finland. The only devia-
tion from this is that the scoring rule is broadly defined and the final scoring rule can be 
seen after the decision of contracts has been made.  
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Based on Che´s work ( Che 1993, 673) a unique symmetric equilibrium of a first-score 
auction is where companies offer, 
 
  q, (Ө ) = argmax s (q ) – c ( q, Ө ) 
  ps ( Ө ) = c ( q, Ө ) + (t), t)
N-1 
dt 
 
 which is initially drawn by Riley and Samuelson (1981). By differentiating the price 
equation with respect to the number of firms in the market shows that the equilibrium 
bids are decreasing in the degree of market competition. 
 
The assumption is that the first-price sealed-bid auction is forcing competing companies 
to make their offers of products in a manner that will still secure some profits for the 
producing companies. Simultaneously, they are making their offers at the lowest possi-
ble price in order to win the contract for a specific product in question. The assumption 
for lowest price comes from the fact that there will be only one company winning a spe-
cific product or substance, and first-price sealed-bid procurement auction as the name 
suggests  does not give any hint of what   the other participating companies are going to 
offer. If all companies offer their prices based on marginal costs (Ө), then the profit 
gained would decrease as the number of competitors increase. It is also assumed that 
marginal cost follows normal distribution and the quality is constant. 
 
The theoretical model that is illustrated in Figure 3, predicts the relationship between 
the degree of competition and prices: when competition increases the price of medicine 
decreases. 
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Figure 3. Equilibrium bids and the degree of competition 
 
The hypothesis of this study is based on the idea that when competition is stepped up, 
with the increased number of companies in the market, the equilibrium bids from phar-
maceutical companies for products in procurement auction decreases. In addition, due to 
the iterated game it is assumed that the offered prices are decreasing in every round.   
 
5 PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET ENVIRONMENT  
 
The pharmaceutical market, like any other market, has a high degree of competition. 
The exception compared to many other markets is its substantial governmental regula-
tion. “Pharmaceutical markets, like all markets, are always and everywhere regulated, 
whether by public agencies (government), private agencies (lawyers and trade associa-
tions), or industry self-regulation.” (Maynard & Bloor 2003, 31-32). In Finland, this 
regulation is done through government actions mainly by legislation which is in harmo-
ny with the European Union’s legislation.  
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Pharmaceutical products, unlike any other commodities, undergo extensive research and 
development processes before entering market. These products also need to be regis-
tered either by national authorities or European Union authorities or both. This registra-
tion verifies that the products are shown to be efficient and safe for human use accord-
ing to their summary of product characteristics. Due to this long and hard process to 
enter the market, these products are usually patent protected for 20 years, which gives 
time for developer company to earn its investments back before the substance is free for 
competition. The government has indirect possibility of regulating the prices and thus 
executes the price control. If a company wants to include its´ prescription based product 
into social insurance system, it has to apply for reasonable price and reimbursement 
from The Pricing Board which works under government control (Mankinen 2006, 5-6). 
 
The hospital market sector can be seen as a business market, where hospital districts as 
institutions, funded by public money transfers, buy products in order to provide a ser-
vice and treatment for patients. This type of demand is called derived demand and in 
this particular case the demand comes from patients being treated in hospitals. Without 
patients, hospitals would not need to buy drugs (Hutt & Speh, 1981, 7). The sellers in 
this context are both international and domestic pharmaceutical companies. All compa-
nies willing to enter the pharmaceutical market have to fulfill requirements stated by 
national and international legislation. 
  
5.1 Market structure and products 
 
In the hospital sector market there are players from both the public and private sector. 
The buyers come mainly from the public sector while sellers come most often from the 
private sector. As in any private company, the sellers´ main interest is to maximize their 
profits, while the buyers’ main interest should be to minimize their costs and as well as 
possible to get highest value for money. That also applies for the drugs they purchase. 
 
Pharmaceutical companies are usually multinational companies operating in different 
kinds of markets. In Finland, drugs that are used in hospitals are required to be accepted 
for drug lists within hospitals. To get a pharmaceutical product accepted into wider use 
in a hospital setting, the pharmaceutical company has to participate in procurement auc-
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tions, which is usually sealed-bid auction and organized by hospital district or pool of 
hospital districts. The pharmaceutical company that is trying to maximize its profit, in 
other words trying to get as high revenue as possible from its products, has to price its 
products in the hospital sector in a manner that they would win the auction over possible 
competitors and still not be selling below its production cost.  
 
In briefly this profit maximization can be expressed as,  
 
 Π (profit) = R (revenue) - C (costs). 
 
The pharmaceutical drugs can be loose, close, or perfect substitutes for one another and 
thus the competitive situation between different products is divided by Guo and Kelton 
as intermarket, where drugs are competing within the same therapeutic class (ATC 3
rd
  
level), interbrand where drugs are competing within the same pharmacological sub-
group (ATC 4
th
 level), brand-generic competition where drugs are of same substance 
but manufactured either by the originator as a brand name drug or by the generic manu-
facturer as a generic name drug (ATC 5
th
 level). The fourth group they have is generic 
competition, which is between the drugs of same substance but different generic manu-
facturers (Guo & Kelton 2007, 399). 
 
The competitive status of a drug defines quite well the intensity of competition. The 
product can belong to monopoly products where the degree of competition is almost 
zero. Alternatively, it can have a few competitors being in an oligopoly situation and 
having slightly increased competition. Under perfect competition, with several competi-
tors the price competition becomes heavier. The number of pharmaceutical companies 
actively operating in the market selling the same substance under different trade name 
affects the competition. The more companies there are selling the same substance the 
higher the competition will be and the lower the real selling price of that product.  
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5.1.1 Monopoly products 
 
Drugs can be divided based on their competitive status in market structure. In a monop-
oly setting, there is only one company which manufactures and sells a particular drug 
(substance) as the sole supplier (Mäkelä 1999, 71). Normally, this is a product that is a 
completely new compound, innovative, an original product which a pharmaceutical 
company has developed and patented. Partly through international patent protection, 
and partly being a first supplier there is no competition yet in the market. In certain 
situations this means that the product is the only available choice. Often this situation 
does not last for a long period of time, either because of parallel importing or other 
similar products with slightly different molecular form entering the market. 
 
Sometimes this monopoly situation can last for years. Usually in these situations the 
product in question is such that manufacturing of the product needs very advanced, and 
specific, technology or the raw material is hard to acquire. The product can also be 
manufactured for some rare disease where the manufacturer already knows that there 
will be no high revenues in quantities expected. Often these products are not meant for 
the mass markets at all. A good example from Finland is a biosynthetic glucagon that is 
meant for treating severe hypoglycaemia, a very low blood sugar level, in patients hav-
ing diabetes mellitus. The product entered market in 1965, and it is still the sole product 
for this treatment (National Agency for Medicines, drug search, 31.12.2008). 
 
5.1.2 Oligopoly products 
 
In an oligopolistic situation, there are only a few companies but the decisions they make 
(especially in pricing) have an impact on the other companies’ decisions (Mäkelä 1999, 
76). With respect to drugs, the situation usually turns from monopolistic to oligopolistic 
within the first one or two years that the new innovative product has entered the market. 
The new comers, even though they seem to be different from existing products, are 
quite similar in the chemical composition of a substance and can be handled as thera-
peutic substances. They act in a similar way in the body and are directed for the treat-
ment of the same disease. The outcome of the treatment is assumed to be exactly the 
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same. Due to their similarity in mechanism of action, these can be used to substitute 
each other without any bigger problems.  
 
Examples of oligopolistic competition can be seen within dexamethasons that are indi-
cated as examples for the treatment of symptoms caused by rheumatoid arthritis or al-
lergic reactions. At the end of 2008, there were three different dexamethason products 
registered in Finland, these were manufactured by two different companies (National 
Agency of Medicines, search for drugs 31.12.2008). Another example is products that 
are indicated for treatment of haemophilia B, which is a recessively inherited bleeding 
disease in boys caused by deficiency in factor IX (Duodecim 1991, 131). Currently 
there are two products, from two manufacturers on the market (National Agency of 
Medicines, search for drugs 31.12.2008). 
 
5.1.3 Products under perfect competition 
 
In perfect competition, there are several companies manufacturing similar products 
(Mäkelä 1999, 62). Drugs are like any other products on the market: the more common 
the disease is, the more potential users there are for that specific product, the more com-
panies are keen to manufacture that particular product in the hope of gaining high prof-
its.  
 
Usually, after a new innovative drug has entered the market there comes more products 
with a similar mechanism of action that is indicated for the same treatment (also known 
as therapeutic substitutes). This means oligopolistic competition is quickly moving to-
wards perfect competition. The more commercially attractive the treatment is, for in-
stance treatment for high cholesterol levels, the more companies that are entering the 
market. Products can be brought onto market through parallel imports when one com-
pany buys the product from some other country, re-labels the product and sells it in Fin-
land for a higher price than it paid for it in the country where it was purchased. This 
parallel import is based on free movement of people and goods within the European 
Union. This can be done even when the original product is still under patent protection.   
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After the patent has expired, there comes several generic products (same substance with 
similar other features of the product) and market situation changes into one of perfect 
competition. With this similarity, one product can substitute any other with the same 
substance. This is called for generic substitutability. When pharmaceutical products 
have reached the situation of perfect competition, the law of supply and demand will 
take over in the market and affect the pricing of these products. The price levels are 
declining while the numbers of generic or parallel imported products are increasing.  
 
Examples of perfect competition in pharmaceuticals are the well known ibuprofen 
products. With the term perfect competition in this particular example is meant a situa-
tion where there are several choices of the same substance available on the market. 
These are widely used for several types of pain, flu like symptoms and fever. There 
were totally ten different trademarks for ibuprofen in Finland from five different manu-
factures registered by the end of year 2008 (National Agency of Medicines, search for 
drugs 31.12.2008). 
 
To summarize, the competitive situation with different types of products with different 
pricing pattern Figure 4 will show the products in market structure and how it develops 
from a monopoly towards perfect competition and how the price develops throughout 
this transition. 
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Status: 
 
 
 
first product  similar products  generic products  
entering  entering   entering 
the market  the market  the market 
 
               < ----------  parallel imported products entering the market ---------------> 
Pricing: 
monopoly pricing oligopoly  competitive pricing  
as high as possible pricing 
Price competition: 
 does not exist   can exist,                          do exist, 
     mild to moderate     strong 
 
Figure 4. Product status and price development of the drug in market structure 
 
As competition in the market increases, it will lower the prices and thus companies 
profits. At some point profits equals zero and the decreasing price after that point will 
cause negative income from that market. With game theory probability of winning is 
decreasing as the number of players is increasing. 
 
6 MEDICINES PROCUREMENT IN FINLAND 
 
The procurement auction is the type of auction that is used in Finland for buying drugs 
for hospitals, hospital districts, or purchasing pools of several hospital districts. It is a 
game between suppliers, who are the manufactures of drugs and purchasing parties who 
are hospital pharmacies. 
 
Based on the auction and game theories it can be said that pharmaceuticals are subject 
to sealed-bid auction where all bids are given simultaneously in sealed-bid envelopes. 
No player has any certainty of which other players are bidding for the same items. There 
Monopoly Oligopoly Perfect competition 
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is also no knowledge of what the level the price will reach. It could also be seen as an n-
stage game with several players (pharmaceutical companies), this is also known as the 
iterated prisoner’s dilemma. The beginning of each new tender year can be seen as new 
round in the game, even though it may be for different hospital districts than the pre-
vious round. After each round all players acquire the information of what the other 
players bid but still there is no information as to what the others are going to bid in the 
next round. Consequently, the second round is still full of uncertainty, but most likely 
the starting point will be the prices from last round. This lack of information and com-
plete uncertainty of future wins/loses is the main characteristic of the procurement auc-
tion of drugs.  The game is repeated round after round (year after year) with mainly the 
same players competing in consecutive years.  
 
Currently, many hospital districts build purchasing pools in order to gain more power as 
a purchaser with a larger size. They make decisions based on offers received through 
sealed-bid auctions, either as a one pool or as hospital districts per se. As the Act on 
public contracts states, all bids to purchasing pools are made public when the pool ap-
proves the supply contract (Act on Public Contracts, see also Pekurinen et al 2005, 21). 
 
A new procurement process starts within the purchaser organization at the end of the 
previous procurement period. The first publicly noticed action is the tender request by 
the purchaser, which can be one hospital district, one hospital, pool of hospital districts 
or any other institute or combination of hospitals or hospital districts. After the tender 
request becomes public, all potential suppliers are able to order the tender documents 
and submit usually a sealed-bid tender within the time frame that has been stated in the 
tender request. After a certain point, the tenders that the purchaser has received, will be 
opened and reviewed. Usually the first step is to evaluate whether the suppliers fulfill 
the requirements that had been stated in the tender request. Those suppliers not fulfilling 
all requirements, and those whose tenders have been received late, will be rejected from 
the final comparison of tenders as stated by the legislation in order to maintain equal 
conditions for each player. After a comparison of tenders the decisions are made and all 
suppliers of tenders are informed about the results. Ordinarily, in procurement auctions 
the lowest bid wins the contract of supplying the drugs for the length of the contract 
period. In pharmaceutical procurement auctions it is normal practice that the procure-
ment is divided into pieces, where each therapeutic group or substance is considered as 
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one item. This decision is made solely by the purchaser and revealed after the decision 
has been made.  
 
There is also a possibility that the company, which had submitted the bid and lost, will 
make an official complaint if they feel that the comparison of drugs and decision based 
on that has not been made with good reason. The complaint has to be made within a 
certain time limit after receiving the results. When this time has expired the contracts 
are written between the purchaser and supplier. After contracts are signed all prices and 
tender documents, except those stated in Act on the Openness of Government Activi-
ties, are free to be reviewed by anyone willing to do so. 
 
The process of drug procurement is described more thoroughly by Remes (2005) in her 
doctoral thesis. The graph is reproduced here in Appendix 3 with some small modifica-
tions. It explains the procurement process path in more detail based on one of the hos-
pital districts, Helsinki-Uusimaa, and their way to handle the process from start to 
finish. According to this, fulfilling the process will take approximately 10 months 
(Remes 2005, 48). 
 
It is highly unlikely that any collusive actions are present in procurements of medicines 
in publicly funded hospital districts. This possibility of collusion is low because almost 
all procurement documents of pharmaceutical products become public property after the 
contracts have been signed. With this publicity each player can be detected as well as 
the prices they have tendered for different products.  
 
6.1 Application of game theory in the form of auction into procurement of drugs 
 
The theoretical model of the procedure, how auction theory and game theory are applied 
into procurement of drugs in Finland is explained here and illustrated in the following 
Table 2. 
 
The auctioneer, which is hospital district or pool of hospital districts (A-F), announces 
the tender in 2003 (round) for covering years 2004-2006 (can also be a longer or a 
shorter period). The assumption is that both hospital districts A and B are offered the 
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same price for the same product. The auction is open, sealed-bid, first-price auction 
where each company (C1-C5) can participate. In round 2003, there are two companies, 
C1 and C2, that have registered the product X and can thus give an offer if they so wish. 
Company C1 sets the price for the product X as 100, p(Xc1) =100, while company C2 
sets the price for the same product X as 80, p(Xc2)=80. The auctioneer takes the lowest 
price as winner for the contract, so company C2 gets the contract with winning price, 
p(Xc2)=80. The next round is in following year 2004 and this time there are four possi-
ble competitor companies (C1-C4) with the same product X registered on the market. 
The auctioneers are different hospital districts than the last round but the product is the 
same. This round the companies know what was the last rounds winning price. In an 
attempt to win this round they take into consideration last rounds winning price, 
p(Xc2)=80 and the possible number of competitors (4). They do not know which com-
panies will give the best offer and they do not know what price the others are offering. 
Consequently they have to play the game and try to figure out somehow which would 
be the outcome of this round. 
 
The outcome for round 2004, turned out that from four possible competitors only three 
gave the offer. All offered prices were below the winning price from round 2003. And 
winning price was p(Xc4)=62 from company C4.  
 
These rounds follow each other and eventually hospital districts A and B are asking for 
tenders again in round 2006. At that time there were already five possible companies 
(C1-C5) offering the same product and over the years the price has dropped so that the 
winning price will be p(Xc3)=25. 
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Table 2. Theoretical model of procurement auctions by several hospital districts (A-F) as se-
quential games during tender rounds (years 2003-2006) with several companies (C1-C5). 
Round 
2003 hospitals dis-
tricts 
A                                          B 
companies C1 C2    
product Xc1 
 
Xc2 
 
   
offered price 100 80    
winner price = 
real price 
 80 
   
2004 hospital dis-
tricts 
C                                          D 
companies C1 C2 C3 C4  
product Xc1 
 
Xc2 
 
Xc3 
 
Xc4 
 
 
offered price 70 65 - 62  
winner price    62  
2005 hospital dis-
tricts 
E                                             F 
companies C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 
product Xc1 
 
Xc2 
 
Xc3 
 
Xc4 
 
Xc5 
 
offered price 55 53 45 48 50 
winner price   45   
2006 hospital dis-
tricts 
A                                               B 
companies C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 
product Xc1 
 
Xc2 
 
Xc3 
 
Xc4 
 
Xc5 
 
offered price 35 30 25 24 26 
winner price   25   
 
Looking at the company C1 which has not received a contract in all these rounds, the 
question arises: is it worth having their product X on the market any more. Or how low 
can company C1 go with the price until it becomes unprofitable? These questions are 
not answered in this thesis. 
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7 EMPIRICAL WORK 
 
The aim of this empirical work is to evaluate if there is any pattern emerging from the 
procurement process as an iterated game, affecting real prices as a result of increased 
competition within the pharmaceutical market. In brief, to see if increased competition 
on the market, as could be assumed, and at the same time on-going iterated game, which 
could also be assumed to decrease the prices, together have accelerating effect on lower-
ing the prices.  As a result we should see how prices of different products (be it in a 
monopoly, oligopoly or perfect competition) have developed throughout the tender pe-
riods. 
 
With this empirical study I would like to find answers for two study questions. 
 
1. Does increased competition within pharmaceutical markets lower the cost for 
medicines offered to hospitals in a sealed-bid, procurement auction setting? 
2. Do these prices continue to decrease constantly through the various rounds? In 
other words, how do auction rounds affect the offered prices of pharmaceuticals?  
 
My hypothesis is; 
- increased competition has lowered the offered prices of medicines based on 
Che’s model 
- sealed-bid auctions have caused the prices to decrease in each round (year) espe-
cially with products having oligopolistic or perfect competition status  
 
While there is no similar study conducted in Finland the results of this study will give 
an indication of how society’s prescription drug bill in a hospital setting has developed 
in reality in Finland during a five years period from 2003 to 2007.  Unfortunately, being 
the first study of this kind there is no clear economic method for studying this topic. My 
aim in this paper is to also find out if any model could be found for future studies. 
 
Pekurinen et al (2005,21) state in their work that even though “there is no upper limit 
for discounts given to purchasing pools by pharmaceutical companies, they rarely ex-
ceed 60 per cent”. 
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After their work (Pekurinen et al. 2005), generic substitution has increased, in addition 
cost consciousness within hospital districts has increased and that helped me to choose 
this topic for my thesis. Also, discount per cent is totally dependant on the price that has 
been given as official wholesale price and therefore it may vary from 0 to almost 100 
per cent. This is also the main reason for not concentrating on discount percentages. 
 
7.1 Study design and data 
 
This study is retrospective and its main concern is hospital districts and their procure-
ment decisions as a result of procurement auctions. Samples, including information 
about different procurement outcomes (prices), were requested from all hospital districts 
pharmacies in Finland. The procurement periods (time) have been gathered by me. In-
formation on substances in anatomical therapeutic chemical grouping and number of 
registration of trade marks by substances was collected from the National Agency of 
medicines statistics. From the samples that were received a panel data will be created.  
 
Out of all anatomical therapeutic chemical (ATC) groups, I have chosen to focus on the 
ATC-group L, antineoplastic and immunomodulating agents (www.nam.fi, taken 
22.9.2007, where the complete list of ATC-groups can be found), this is because it has a 
high financial value and it has been constantly increasing in over previous years.  
 
Pharmaceutical sales in monetary terms, based on official wholesale prices (prices to 
pharmacy) are received from the national statistics on medicines (Finnish Statistics on 
Medicines 2007, 48-49).  Total pharmaceutical sales at wholesale prices were almost 
1,8 billion Euros in 2007. Hospital sales comprised 23 % of this while pharmacy sales 
were 77 %. The total sale of ATC-group L was nearly 270 million Euros and 44 % of 
that was utilized in hospitals. Sales of group L comprised of 29,07 % of the total sales at 
wholesale prices of all ATC code groups in hospitals. Subsequently, the group under 
study comprises almost one third of all drugs purchased for hospitals. The exact figures 
can be seen in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Total sales of pharmaceuticals and sales of ATC-group L at wholesale prices 
 Finnish Statistics on Medicines 2007, 48-49. 
 
ATC code Total sales at 
wholesale 
prices (EUR 
1000) 
Pharmacies vs. 
Hospitals, sales 
in % 
Hospital sales  
(EUR 1000) 
Hospital sales 
of L, % of total 
hospital sales 
L 269 319 56 vs. 44 118 500 29,07 
Total, all ATC 
codes 
1 772 498 77 vs. 23 407 674  
 
 
The prices that have been offered to the hospital districts are based on the information 
collected from hospital districts. A request for procurement decisions of antineoplastic 
and immunomodulating agents covering the years 2003-2007 has been sent to all 21 
hospital district pharmacists on October 17, 2008. Responses were received from eight 
hospital districts. Seven hospital districts provided these documents either by post or e-
mail, and one I received from the hospital district’s homepages where the documents I 
needed were available. The material has been collected during November 2008 and Jan-
uary 2009. I have marked the different hospital districts / procurement pools with the 
alphabet (A-H). 
 
In total there are 3470 items tracked down in the sample as can be seen on Table 4. 
Items are considered as one observation including some or all of following information: 
atc4, atc5, substance, year, comp, status1, district, procurement, round, product, 
strength, pack size, status2, official price, rebate percent, tender price and real price. If 
any of previously mentioned variables were missing from the original data received, the 
information has been taken from officially available sources (Finnish Statistics of Medi-
cines, official price data from CD-Pharmaca Fennica) or calculated (rebate percent). 
 
A vast majority of substances belongs to a group that are under the condition of compe-
tition (44 %) and the second biggest group are products that have a monopoly status 
with almost 34 % coverage. Finally, oligopoly products cover nearly 20 %. The com-
plete spectrum of shares can be seen in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Market structure of products in data 
 
 market structure Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 competition 1534 44,2 44,2 44,2 
  exit 23 ,7 ,7 44,9 
  monopoly 1170 33,7 33,7 78,6 
  not offered 64 1,8 1,8 80,4 
  oligopoly 679 19,6 19,6 100,0 
  Total 3470 100,0 100,0   
 
 
 
Competition is counted as 3 or more trade names and oligopoly with two trade names 
competing in the market. Not offered means the substances that have not been offered at 
all for auction or are not on the market at all. Exit stands for products that have exited 
(left) the market during period 2003-2007. With a monopoly and oligopoly situation 
there can be only one or two companies present in the market. With competition status 
there are several companies on the market each having one trade name. 
 
From the original data all observations that had no information in the variable round 
were cleaned out from the final data that had been analysed. In practise, it means that 
these products had not been offered during any round so these had no tender price in-
formation for any of the years. The substances that had no offers, or any data given dur-
ing the period 2003-2007, are listed in Appendix 4 in parentheses. In total, there were 
23 such substances.  
 
For statistical purposes I have used SPSS 14.0 for Windows and STATA version 10. 
 
7.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
In the data the same products appear at several points in time. The product status is de-
fined as monopoly (only one product available of that particular substance), oligopoly 
(two products available of that particular substance) or perfect competition (three or 
more products available of that particular substance). The official wholesale price of the 
products is taken from the procurement documents if possible. If those wholesale prices 
are not received from these documents, then the retail prices are taken from CD-
Pharmaca as January 1, as announced for each year and then the official wholesale pric-
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es are calculated according to pharmacy pricing taxation system. CD-Pharmaca is a tool 
for health care people where the information on products is available. It contains a 
summary of product characteristics, prices, reimbursement status and marketer. The 
data that has been gathered covers five consecutive years, 2003-2007 from rounds 2001-
2006. 
 
The data has been arranged in variables based on the information received. Some neces-
sary dummy variables have also been created. Part of the information was gathered from 
publicly available sources, and part has been received from hospital districts. Combin-
ing these sources, following basic variables in Table 5 have been identified. 
 
Table 5. Descriptions of basic variables 
atc4 anatomical therapeutic chemical group atc4, in some cases substances can 
be seen as therapeutic substitutes within atc4 (example L01XA platinum 
compounds) 
atc5 anatomical therapeutic chemical group 5, in all cases substances within 
group atc5 are substitutes to each other (example L01XA02 carboplatin) 
substance effective substance in product (example carboplatin) 
year year the given price is effective (like from round 2001, the prices can be 
effective in years 2002-2004) 
comp number of competitors that have been registered by National Agency of 
Medicines by January 1
st
, taken from annual books of classification of 
medicines and defined daily doses 
status1 stating the status of the product: monopoly, oligopoly or perfect competi-
tion in that particular year, based on the information from number of com-
petitors 
district stating the particular hospital district or hospital districts as a pool for 
which the information is connected 
procurement stating how the procurement is done, either as own or as pooled 
round stating the year when the procurement has been done, year when the tender 
request has been submitted, 2001-2006 
product the trade name of the product 
strength the strength of the product 
pack size stating the particular pack size in question 
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status2 stating the type of product: original (produced by originator company), 
generic (produced by generic company or parallel (produced to market by 
parallel importing company) 
official price the officially listed wholesale price of the particular product – strength – 
pack size combination without value added tax 
rebate percent the given discount in percent for the official price in tender 
tender price the price after official price minus rebate percent without value added tax 
real price the price of those products that have been accepted in tender process for 
contracts also known as winners, without value added tax 
   
In addition to these basic variables, the following additional variables in Table 6 have 
been created in order to get data ready for analysis. 
 
Table 6. Descriptions of additional variables 
discount discount percent  (%) from official wholesale price  
status3 differentiating original (1) – generic (2) –parallel (3) 
market differentiating all atc5 groups as own market 1-121  
lnpricer log (realprice) 
lnpricet log (tenderprice) 
lndiscount log (discount) 
productnro stating the combinations of particular product-strength-packsize-status2, 1-
353 
averageprice mean(realprice) by round, the average price of real prices and all products 
in round n ; winner´s average prices by rounds 
awprice mean(realprice) by substances, the average price of real prices by sub-
stances in round n ; winner´s average prices by substances (including dif-
ferent packages and strengths) and by rounds 
atprice mean tender price per substance 
awpricer average winning price 
atpricer mean tender price per round 
uwprice unit winner price = realprice/packsize 
utprice unitprice = tenderprice/packsize 
auwprice mean (uwprice) 
auwpricer mean (uwprice), by round per market 
autprice mean (utprice) 
 37 
autpricer mean (utprice), by round 
lnutprice log (utprice) 
tutprice lnskew0 tutprice=utprice 
bcutprice bcskew0 bcutprice=utprice 
ln2price lnskew0 ln2price=lnutprice 
ntutprice lnskew0 ntutprice=utprice,level(95) 
aprice mean (utprice) 
   
The following dummy variables in Table 7 have been created to keep the data in better 
control. 
 
Table 7. Descriptions of dummy variables 
winner stating the winning price (real price) =1, something else = 0 
pool stating those tenders that have been made as pooled = 1, not in pooled = 0 
generic-
parallel-
original 
stating what type of product is concerned; if generic =1, others =0; if paral-
lel =1, others = 0;  if original =1, others = 0 
sum of generic-
parallel-
original 
shall equal 1, control for previous dummy 
market1-
market121 
it is essential to control every market of its own because the price differ-
ences are so wide between different markets; market in question =1, others 
= 0 
round1-round6 stating the rounds when the procurements have been done, when the tender 
request have been submitted (round1=2001-round6=2005), if round 1 = 1, 
others = 0; if round 2 = 1, others = 0, etc. 
year03-07 years that procurements affects 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, if year 
2003=1, others=0; year 2004=1, others=0, etc. 
districtA-I  hospital districts or pooled hospital districts, if district A=1, others=0; dis-
trict 2004=1, other=0, etc. 
Imarket1-
Imarket121 
market dummy defined by substance; if substance being e.g. dacarbat-
zine=1, others=0 
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The data gathered turned out to be very challenging. The panel data model could not be 
estimated because there are plenty of similar observations like one product having the 
same price in different years within the same round (year of tenders made). This reason 
has made it impossible to use lagged price variables in product level. Using the panel 
model at the hospital district level would also be of no use because it would only give a 
picture of one hospital district over several years, and not the dynamic change in the 
whole market area from one round to the other.  
 
As an example of price changes with the increased number of competitors in procure-
ment settings I will present paclitaxel. The numbers of competitors are counted as the 
number of different trade mark registration with a particular substance, in this case pa-
clitaxel. As originator’s paclitaxel has three different strength (30 mg, 100 mg and 300 
mg), these are shown here separately. The price is unit price per pack; all companies 
have same pack size, one vial. From these Figures 5-8 it is obvious that when the num-
ber of competitors (which is shown in left hand side y-axis and drawn as bars) is in-
creased, the lowest real price in € (the yellow line) received by hospital district or 
pooled districts in the procurement auction for each year is decreasing quite dramati-
cally. The originator has not changed the official price in € (pink line) at all. Prices are 
in € on the right hand side y-axis. Consequently, what can be concluded from this is that 
when generic competitors arrive onto market, the real purchasing price of a product will 
fall, and the gap between originator’s official wholesale price, and the real purchasing 
price of the product, is increasing.  
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Figure 5. Paclitaxel 30 mg real price changes in € (right y-axis, yellow line) compared to origi-
nator’s official wholesale price in € (right y-axis, pink line) with number of competitors (bar, 
left y-axis) 2003-2007.  
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Figure 6. Paclitaxel 100 mg real price changes in € (right y-axis, yellow line) compared to 
originator’s official wholesale price in € (right y-axis, pink line) with number of competitors 
(bar, left y-axis) 2003-2007. 
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Figure 7. Paclitaxel 300 mg real price changes in € (right y-axis, yellow line) compared to 
originator’s official wholesale price in € (right y-axis, pink line) with number of competitors 
(bar, left y-axis) 2003-2007. 
 
Then there is also the situation when a generic manufacturer brings another package 
size into market. In this case it was 150 mg.  What can be seen in Figure 8 is that the 
starting price of a new pack size is already much lower than would have been in the 
originator’s case, if the originator’s price would have been in line with their other pack 
sizes.  
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Figure 8. Paclitaxel 150 mg real price in € (right y-axis, yellow line) with number of competi-
tors (bar, left y-axis) 2003-2007. 
 41 
Out of the original 3470 observations, all those observations that had no value in any of 
the years (2005-2007) or rounds (2001-2006) were disregarded and the final numbers of 
observations become 3273. This is the final data to be used for statistical purposes for 
estimating the theoretical model. 
 
The competition within the atc-group L in atc5-level varies largely from being none 
existent to 31 competitors with the arithmetic mean being 2.9 and standard deviation 
being 2.3. There is only one market where the numbers of competitors exceed eight. 
This market is for bicalutamide which lost its´ patent during the study period of 2003-
2007. This clearly indicates the interest of generic products entering the market which 
are assumed to give good return on investment. 
 
The wide variety between the prices can be seen if we look at the minimum and maxi-
mum official wholesale prices by rounds and years (the full extracts from STATA can 
be found from appendices). In the following table there are two tendencies that can be 
observed. First, the mean price in both rounds and years is increasing over time, and 
second, the maximum price seems to decrease over time. 
 
Table 8. Official wholesale price variances by rounds and by years 
Official wholesale price mean min max 
round 2001 206,11 1,51 4961,54 
round 2002 274,77 1,52 4255,15 
year 2003 229,21 1,51 4961,54 
round 2003 269,05 5,29 4255,15 
year 2004 233,37 1,51 4961,54 
round 2004 260,42 1,52 1652,56 
year 2005 269,79 1,52 4255,15 
round 2005 367,29 1,90 2960,00 
year 2006 330,42 1,52 2960,00 
round 2006 352,73 1,81 1890,00 
year 2007 333,05 1,52 2960,00 
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In the following graph, Figure 9, it can be seen that the mean official wholesale prices 
are clearly increasing when viewed by either rounds or years. The only explanation I 
can see for this is the new substances that have entered the pharmaceutical market. 
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Figure 9. Trends in official wholesale prices in €, by years and by rounds 
 
There are wide differences between, and within substance prices, and also with different 
pack sizes, one having 28 tablets while the other having 98 tablets, so it was meaningful 
to create one common comparable price, unit price. The unit price is calculated as ten-
der price per pack by product numbers (combination of product, strength, pack size and 
status 2) giving the unit price for one tablet, vial etc.  
 
Looking at the tender prices we find that the different substances have many different 
trade names. Each trade name may have several strengths and within each trade name 
and strength there can be more than one pack size. In order to be able to compare tender 
prices with these numerous combinations of trade name + strength + pack size it was 
necessary to create one comparable variable, the average tender price per pack size by 
substance and the result is the unit price. Thereafter, I created the average unit price 
based on the product numbers (product number is created by combining product trade 
name, strength, pack size and status 2) on the market level atc5. The following two-way 
scatter diagram, Figure 10, illustrates the distribution of average unit prices per rounds.  
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Figure 10. Average unit prices in € of by rounds 
 
Figure 11 shows the wide variance between mean unit prices and the tendency towards 
higher prices overall. Most unit prices are below 500 € but there are an increasing num-
ber of unit prices going above 500 € in the later years of this study.  
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Figure 11. Average unit price in € by rounds 
 
In the following two-way graph Figure 12, the average unit winning price per round is 
decreased between 2002 and 2004. The average unit winning price comes from the cal-
culation of real price/pack size = unit price, where the real price stands for one particu-
lar product, the combination of trade name, strength and pack size, that has been ac-
cepted to receive contract by round (= winner). After that, the average of each these 
combinations of unit prices are counted to receive the total average unit winning price in 
monetary form (Euro) by rounds. From 2004, the average unit winning price increases 
rapidly. One reason for this might be the new substances entering the pharmaceutical 
market in 2004 (busulfan, celecoxib and adalimumab), in 2005 (pemetrexed, setuximab, 
bevasizumab, mitotane, bortezomib, fulvestrant, everolimas and efalizumab) and in 
2006 (oxaliplatin, erlotinib and anagrelid). In practise, some hospital districts accepted 
new products into their tenders, if the product is believed to have the marketing authori-
zation granted by the beginning of the procurement period. The prices of the new sub-
stances are usually higher than the older substances. To verify this, a more thorough 
study should be conducted to investigate this effect. But this increased trend is in line 
with the increased total cost of group L. 
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Figure 12. Average unit winning price in € by rounds 
 
If we look at the price tendency by sorting the data based on rounds and by markets 
(substances) in Figures 10 and 12 we can see how the mean unit price and the mean 
winning unit price have increased throughout the rounds. This is in line with the total 
sales increases in hospital markets. 
 
7.3 Statistical analysis 
 
During this thesis, multiple regression analysis has been used in order to study the effect 
of different variables on unit prices of tenders and to find out the possible connection 
between variables and if possible, to test the theoretical model behind the price forma-
tion in the procurement auction process. The regressand in my model is the unit price. 
As can be seen from previously presented Figure 10, the mean unit price of substances 
in Euro terms has increased during 2001-2006. It is assumed that regressors number of 
competition (comp), procurement done in pooling (pool), increased number of generic 
competitors (generic), increased number of parallel imported products (parallel) and the 
iterated rounds, when procurement have been done (rounds 1-6) would affect the price 
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formation of the unit prices. It is assumed that after each round, when the winning price 
from previous round is publicly known, it will affect the next round price formation 
(tender price). Before running a regression model, the distribution and correlation of 
regressors will be checked to confirm that these can be chosen. After that, the multiple 
regression models will be run in steps to see the effects of regressors on the regressant. 
The first step is to look only at the effect of a few regressors, namely number of compet-
itors and the effect of the rounds. The second step will be with additional regressors in 
the model. In the third step all previous regressors as well as all substances (markets) 
are going to be used as regressors.  
 
The regressors (not including markets) that I have chosen have following distribution in 
the data to be analyzed. The full distribution is seen in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. Distribution of regressors used, mean and standard deviation 
 
variable mean standard deviation 
competition 2.947 2.320 
pool 0.604 0.489 
generic 0.256 0.437 
parallel 0.005 0.068 
round 2 0.164 0.370 
round 3 0.040 0.197 
round 4 0.236 0.424 
round 5 0.310 0.462 
round 6 0.031 0.174 
round 1 0.219 0.414 
 
  
As these chosen regressors do not correlate to each other (Table 10), all of them can be 
used in the multiple regression model. 
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Table 10. Correlation matrix of regressors used 
 
 competition pool generic parallel round 2 round 3 round 4 round 5 round 6 round 1 
competition 1.0000          
pool 0.0582 1.0000         
generic 0.3420 0.0287 1.0000        
parallel 0.0678 -0.0283 -0.0398 1.0000       
round 2 -0.0361 -0.5468 -0.0047 0.0066 1.0000      
round 3 -0.0067 -0.2530 0.0078 -0.0139 -0.0908 1.0000     
round 4 0.0642 0.4497 0.0406 -0.0377 -0.2459 -0.1138 1.0000    
round 5 -0.0049 0.1154 -0.0323 0.0133 -0.2966 -0.1372 -0.3716 1.0000   
round 6 0.0041 -0.2214 0.0277 -0.0122 -0.0795 -0.0368 -0.0996 -0.1201 1.0000  
round 1 -0.0267 0.1125 -0.0166 0.0296 -0.2349 -0.1087 -0.2943 -0.3549 -0.0951 1.0000 
 
 
 
From this first regression model (Table 11.) where I have only part of the regressors, it 
can be seen that number of competitors predicts the price to decrease as expected. But 
the opposite as was assumed the rounds have an increased effect on prices, which is 
increasing after each round. The explanatory power (coefficient of determination (R
2
)) 
of the model is low. The F-test is significant. The multicollinearity for this model gave 
the mean variance inflatory factor (VIF) 1.33. All regressors got VIF well below 5 
highest being for round 5 VIF 1.67 therefore there seems to be no fundamental prob-
lems with the multicollinearity in this model. 
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Table 11. The unit price is explained with number of competitors and different rounds. OLS, 
robust standard errors. 
unit price coefficient robust 
Std.Err. 
p> t  N R
2
 F  
(6. 
3266) 
reset  
(3, 
3263) 
 
 
   3273 0.024 11.54 
Prob > 
F = 
0.000 
17.38 
Prob > 
F = 
0.000 
competition -12.387 1.906 0.000***     
round 2 6.240 12.039 0.604     
round 3 37.671 19.584 0.054     
round 4 36.461 11.143 0.001**     
round 5 61.598 12.055 0.000***     
round 6 90.190 31.826 0.005**     
constant 124.172 10.057 0.000***     
* P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01, *** P < 0.001 
 
 
With logarithmic unit prices (Table 12.) the result is a bit different. In this model the 
second round is also predicting price decreases but still the R
2
 is very low. Conse-
quently, this estimation is no better than the basic model and thus will also be rejected.  
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Table 12. The unit price (log) is explained with number of competitors and different rounds. 
OLS, robust standard errors. 
lnunit price coefficient robust 
Std.Err. 
p> t  N R
2
 F  
(6. 
3266) 
reset 
(3, 
3263) 
 
 
   3273 0.026 16.08 
Prob > 
F 
12.27 
Prob > 
F  
      = 0.000 = 0.000 
competition -.116 .017 0.000***     
round 2 -.129 .133 0.335     
round 3 .689 .207 0.001**     
round 4 .388 .121 0.001**     
round 5 .518 .112 0.000***     
round 6 .802 .250 0.001**     
constant 3.02 .098 0.000***     
* P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01, *** P < 0.001 
 
Adding all the chosen regressor (except markets) variables is an attempt to find a more 
reliable model that would give higher predictive value. I added variables that should 
have impact on price formation: the way the procurement is done (as a pool of hospital 
districts), generic product and parallel imported product as challengers for original 
products. I also retained the variable, rounds, in this model. 
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Table 13. The unit price is explained with all chosen regressors. OLS, standard errors. 
unit price coefficient Std.Err. p> t  N R
2
 F  
(9. 
3263) 
chi
2
 reset 
(3, 
3260) 
 
 
   3273 0.035 13.08 
Prob > 
F 
449.43 
Prob > 
chi
2
 
9.03 
Prob > 
F 
      = 
0.000 
= 
0.000 
= 
0.000 
competition -8.245 1.979 0.000***      
pool -16.471 12.838 0.200      
generic -59.851 10.490 0.000***      
parallel -110.098 63.879 0.085      
round 2 -4.877 16.687 0.770      
round 3 26.746 24.958 0.284      
round 4 41.492 13.283 0.002*      
round 5 60.154 11.972 0.000***      
round 6 81.773 27.529 0.003**      
constant 139.527 13.822 0.000***      
* P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01, *** P < 0.001 
 
 
This model (Table 13.) is predicting somewhat better the formation of unit prices. Now, 
the effect of pooling the hospital districts for getting higher negotiation power to lower 
prices is being seen. The effect of generic products and parallel imported products on 
decreasing unit prices can also be seen. At the same time there is the increasing effect 
on prices from rounds three onwards. Pooling is not statistically significant and neither 
is parallel importing in this model while the competitive situation, generic products and 
rounds 4-6 have a statistically significant effect.  
 
The mean VIF for these variables is 1.50, as all variables got a VIF well below 5, so 
multicollinearity is not a problem in this model. The heteroscedasticity was tested with 
Breusch-Pagan test and chi
2
(1) was 449.43 with Prob > F 0.000. Unfortunately, this 
shows high heteroskedasticity and there is specification problem in these models. 
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Table 14. Logarithmic unit price with all chosen regressors (except markets), OLS standard 
errors.  
lnunit price coefficient Std.Err. p> t  N R
2
 F  
(9. 
3263) 
chi
2
 reset 
(3, 
3260) 
 
 
   3273 0.059 22.59 
Prob > 
F 
4.87 
Prob > 
chi
2
 
4.80 
Prob > 
F 
      = 
0.000 
= 
0.027 
= 
0.002 
 
competition -.047 .019 0.011*      
pool -.126 .120 0.295      
generic -.990 .098 0.000***      
parallel -2.232 .599 0.000***      
round 2 -.210 .156 0.179      
round 3 .609 .234 0.009**      
round 4 .425 .125 0.001**      
round 5 .496 .112 0.000***      
round 6 .763 .258 0.003**      
constant 3.170 .130 0.000***      
* P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01, *** P < 0.001 
 
 
Finally, in the third step I included all the different markets on atc5-level into the model 
as well as the competitive situation, pooling of hospital districts, generic and parallel 
imported products and all rounds. The regression model was run with robust standard 
errors. The table for this full model is very large so it can be found completely in Ap-
pendix 7.  In Table 15, all other regressors except markets are shown. 
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Table 15. Full multiple regression model with coefficients and robust standard errors. In the 
table all other regressors shown except markets that can be found in Appendix 7. 
 
unit price coefficient robust 
Std.Err. 
p> t  N R
2
 F  
(98, 
3166) 
reset  
(3, 3163)  
 
 
   3273 0.657 . 
Prob > 
F = . 
53.09 
Prob > F = 
0.000 
competition -3.215 1.574 0.041*     
pool -7.380 9.044 0.415     
generic -42.813 12.920 0.001**     
parallel -17.117 8.926 0.055     
round 2 8.297 11.107 0.455     
round 3 4.236 12.525 0.735     
round 4 6.133 7.771 0.430     
round 5 4.850 8.040 0.546     
round 6 -3.123 18.587 0.867     
constant 22.672 11.250 0.044*     
markets please see Appedix 7     
* P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01, *** P < 0.001 
 
 
This model predicts well the influence of several factors on tender prices. The coeffi-
cient of determination (R-squared) is 0.6572. From all regressors in this model, statisti-
cally significant impact for increasing the tender price is with constant and following 
market regressors (market number in parenthesis): busulfan (5), lomustine (6), temo-
zolomide (7), methotrexate injection/infusion (9), raltitrexed (10), pemetrexed (11), 
cladribine (12), fludarabine (13), cytarabine (15), gemcitabine (18), vindecine (23), vi-
norelbine (24), etoposide (25), paclitaxel (26), docetaxel (27), doxorubicin (29), daun-
orubicin (30), epirubicin (31), idarubicin (33), mitoxantron (34), mitomycin (36), cis-
platin (37), carboplatin (38), oxaliplatin (39), rituximab (41), trastuzumab (42), alemtu-
zumab (43), gemtuzumab (44), bevasizumab (46), verteporfin (48), aminolevuuli-
nateacid (50), amsakrine (57), asparaginase (58), topotecan (63), irinotecan (64), borte-
zomib (69), busereline (75), leuproreline (76), gosereline (77), triptoreline (78), ta-
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moxifen (79), fulvestrant (81), filgrastim (87), molgramostim (88), lenograstim (89), 
pegfilgrastim (90), interferon-gamma (92), interferon alfa-2a (93), interferon alfa-2b 
(94), interferon-beta-1b (96), peginterferon alfa-2b (98), peginterferon alfa-2a (99), 
aldesleucin (100), BCG-vaccin (101), cyclosporine (104), muromonab-CD3 (105), ba-
ciliximab (110), etanercept (112), infliximab (113), anakinra (115), adalimumab (116), 
azatioprin (120) and methotrexate tablets (121).  
 
On the other hand, the following regressors have statistically significant effect on de-
creasing the tender price: competition, generic product, markets chlorambusil (2), mel-
falan (3), fluorouracil (16), carmofur (17), cebecitabine (19), dactinomycin (28), pro-
carbatzine (40), tretinoine (62), celecoxib (70), megestrol (73), toremifen (80), anastro-
zol (84), letrozol (85), exemestan (86), leflunomid (114) and everolimus (117). Multi-
collinearity was tested and the mean VIF was 1.42.  
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Table 16. The magnitude of changes in full model with coefficients and robust standard errors 
except markets that are shown in Appendix 8. 
 
lnunit price coefficient robust 
Std.Err. 
p> t  N R
2
 F  
(98, 
3166) 
reset  
(3, 3163)  
 
 
   3273 0.839 . 
Prob > 
F = . 
2.81 
Prob > F 
= 0.0379 
competition .003 .008 0.696     
pool .012 .053 0.820     
generic -.355 .070 0.000***     
parallel -.598 .189 0.002**     
round 2 .048 .067 0.476     
round 3 .153 .100 0.128     
round 4 .021 .055 0.701     
round 5 .007 .051 0.892     
round 6 -.101 .107 0.343     
constant .549 .173 0.002**     
markets please see Appendix 8     
* P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01, *** P < 0.001 
 
Looking at this model with the inclusion of the different markets explains the complex-
ity of multi-units environment. As Jean-Jacques Laffont has indicated already in 1997 
(Laffont 1997, 19) “…no theory is really available to make clear predictions in the 
common value model with multiple bids, multiple units, asymmetric information and 
collusion.” And this seems to be the problem, especially with multiple units with this 
data too. Including all markets into the model will give a comprehensive picture of all 
possible variables affecting tender prices but at the same time its´ use in practise would 
be very challenging. 
 
For the last I tested a lagged model for explaining the developments in prices. For that 
purpose I created the panel model with lagged price, autprice1 (average unit price 1).  
This model turned out to be extremely challenging, and the lagged effects could not be 
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defined clearly because year and round are not fixed.  The dynamics could not be traced 
confidently so this model needs to be postponed for future studies. 
 
8 CONCLUSIONS AND REMARKS 
 
8.1 Conclusions 
 
Based on the results of this empirical study, and to answer my first study question: 
1. Does increased competition within the pharmaceutical markets lower the medi-
cine prices to hospitals offered in sealed-bid, procurement auction setting? 
I can answer yes, it does. Both increased number of competitors and the generic prod-
ucts entering the market, lower the prices. But adding separate markets as regressors 
into the model, the specificity of the model becomes better while competition has no 
longer significance in lowering the prices. This clearly indicates that markets have high 
impact in the model. 
 
For the second question, 
2. Do these prices continue to decreases through years? In other words do the auc-
tion rounds affect the offered prices of pharmaceuticals to lower?  
My answer is no, based on these data. From this study design there is no answer avail-
able for reason why the prices do not continue to decrease after round 2. 
 
As game theory with repeated games would indicate, that prices begin to fall lower as 
companies get the information from previous round is not shown in this study. One rea-
son could be the market definition of atc5-level. In this study there is a lack of informa-
tion in which atc-level hospital districts make their procurement decisions.  These data 
are also missing information as to if there are any other factors, other than price, affect-
ing the choice of one particular substance. From the buyers´ (hospital districts) point of 
view these data is not promising automatically lowered prices as a result of procurement 
auction, unless there are several competitors in one substance. The prices have a ten-
dency to increase after each round in sequential games instead of decreasing which 
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would be the anticipated result. This raises the question, if procurement auctions would 
be suitable for only those products that are under perfect competition status. 
 
As final conclusion to my master’s thesis, my first hypothesis that prices are lowered by 
increased competition can be confirmed. The second hypothesis that prices will be low-
ered by each round has to be rejected based on these data. 
 
8.2 Remarks 
 
From societal point of view, increased competition with a decreasing price level is with 
no doubt beneficial for society in the long run. Even though the effect of increased 
competition with some products is consumed by new products in a monopoly situation, 
the overall financial effect is positive for decent use of tax funds. Thus it is peculiar, that 
the society is not interested in studying this subject more or having any kind of collec-
tive system of following up the effects of the procurement auctions of medicines. Ex-
tending the data which I have in my thesis into covering all hospital districts and all 
years from 2003 to the present time could give a broad and comprehensive view of how 
different markets are affected. In addition, looking into atc4-group level would give an 
additional view of market changes which might have large impact in understanding the 
price tendency. It could also show the shift from one substance to another within atc4-
group. Using the atc4-level as defining market would raise the question of going more 
towards therapeutic substances instead of keeping in substances ´per se´.  
 
This limited data gives the first hint of which variables are affecting price decreases and 
which affect price increases. Could some of these price increases be tackled by using 
therapeutic substances (atc4-level) as a basis for further studies, is a good question. It 
might work in some medicines groups but probably not in all. It is clear for these data 
that the increased competition, either in the form of generic products entering market or 
parallel imported products entering the market, is affecting the tender prices within that 
particular market. But against my belief that each round would decrease the prices, I 
have to admit I was wrong, and actually the effect is the opposite. This model should be 
improved to take into account new substances entering the market: it could be improved 
to be somehow better weighting the different price levels, because currently there is 
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such a large difference in Euro values between the cheapest and the most expensive 
products. Or one option would be to look at each substance of its´ own and tender price 
development within that substance. 
 
My master’s thesis has been very challenging in many ways, but it has showed me how 
difficult it is to predict a mathematical model from data that is covering several years, 
for several rounds (also given as years), for several hospital districts, and with covering 
multiple separate units in one time with large variety of prices.  
 
There is still much to be done for understanding the dynamics of the procurement auc-
tion of medicines. In the future, to get a completely comprehensive model it should also 
include all other, both financial and non-financial aspects affecting these tender prices. 
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APPENDICIES  
 
APPENDIX 1: Total sales of prescription based pharmaceuticals and sales to hos-
pitals in Finland 2001-2007 (million EUR) 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total sales of 
pharmaceuticals*  
1840 2025 2137 2288 2435 2362 2500 
change % from 
previous year 
11,8 10,0 6,4 7,1 6,4 -1,6 5,9 
sales to hospit-
als** 
253 288 301 325 360 379 408 
change % from 
previous year 
14,2 13,6 8,0 7,8 11,0 5,4 7,5 
* retail prices including VAT 8% 
** wholesale prices excluding VAT 8 % 
Finnish Statistics on Medicines 2001-2007. 
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APPENDIX 2: Pooling of hospital districts 2003-2007   
This information is gathered by Lea Pekkanen in 2003-2008. 
 
Hospital district 2003 2007 
Helsinki and Uusimaa x x 
Varsinais-Suomi x x 
Satakunta x x 
Kymenlaakso x x 
Pirkanmaa x a 
Kanta-Häme x a 
Päijät-Häme x a 
Etelä-Pohjanmaa x a 
Vaasa x a 
Ahvenanmaa x x 
Pohjois-Savo x b (atc-group L) 
Keski-Suomi x b (atc-group L) 
Pohjois-Karjala x x 
Etelä-Karjala x x 
Etelä-Savo x x 
Itä-Savo x x 
Pohjois-Pohjanmaa c d 
Kainuu c d 
Lappi x d 
Länsi-Pohja x d 
Keski-Pohjanmaa x d 
x  procurement on its own 
a, b, c, d  procurement pool 
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APPENDIX 3: Procurement process of drugs  
(imitated from Remes 2005, 127) 
 
 
 
End of prevailing tender period.  
 
Creating of possible procurement pool and 
handing out power of attorneys to responsible 
institution. 
 
Creating choice criterias. 
 
Draw up invitatition to tender (open procure-
ment process for manufacturers). 
 
Publishing tender request (if announcement has 
not been done). 
 
Announcement of tender request. 
 
Checking for accordance of Act on Public 
Contracts. 
 
Receiving/entering tenders and  opening  of 
documents. 
 
Choice process:  
Checking for validity of tenders. 
Comparison of  prices and other characteristics. 
Familiarizing for the use environment and proof testing. 
 
Time to make tenders (companies). 
 
Presenting the procurement. 
Procurement decision. 
 
Waiting time. 
 
Contract. 
 
Ordering of products under contracts. 
 
Delivery. 
 
Receiving, stocking and invoicing. 
 
Use of drugs. 
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APPENDIX 4: List of substances by markets.  
Substances with no offers are in parenthesis. Market number is stated first, then comes 
atc5 –group and the name of the substance. 
 
1: L01AA01    cyclofosfamide 2: L01AA02     chlorambusil 
3: L01AA03    melfalan  4: L01AA06     ifosfamide 
5: L01AB01    busulfan  6: L01AD02      lomustine 
7: L01AX03     temozolomide 8: L01AX04      dacarbatzine 
9: L01BA01     methotrexate inj/inf 10: L01BA03    raltitrexed 
11: L01BA04   pemetrexed 12: L01BB04    cladribine 
13: L01BB05   fludarabine  14: (L01BB06   clofarabine) 
15: L01BC01   cytarabine  16: L01BC02    fluorouracil 
17: L01BC04   carmofur  18: L01BC05    gemcitabine 
19: L01BC06   cabecitabine 20: (L01BC53   tegafur, comb) 
21: L01CA01   vinblastine  22: L01CA02    vincristine 
23: L01CA03   vindecine  24: L01CA04    vinorelbine 
25: L01CB01   etoposide  26: L01CD01    paclitaxel 
27: L01CD02   docetaxel  28: L01DA01    dactinomycin 
29: L01DB01   doxorubicin 30: L01DB02    daunorubicin 
31: L01DB03   epirubicin  32: (L01DB04   aclarubicin) 
33: L01DB06   idarubicin  34: L01DB07    mitoxantron 
35: L01DC01   bleomycin  36: L01DC03    mitomycin 
37: L01XA01   cisplatin  38: L01XA02    carboplatin 
39: L01XA03   oxaliplatin  40: L01XB01    procarbatzine 
41: L01XC02   rituximab  42: L01XC03    trastuzumab 
43: L01XC04   alemtuzumab 44:L01XC05     gemtuzumab 
45: (L01XC06  setuximab) 46: L01XC07    bevasizumab 
47: (L01XD01  porfimersodium) 48: L01XD02    verteporfin 
49: (L01XD03  metylaminolevulinate) 50: L01XD04    aminolevulinateacid 
51: (L01XD05  temoporfin) 52: L01XE01    imatinib 
53: (L01XE03   erlotinib)  54: (L01XE04   sunitinib) 
55: (L01XE05   sorafenib)  56: (L01XE06   dasatinib) 
57: L01XX01    amsakrine  58: L01XX02    asparaginase 
59: L01XX05    hydroxycarbamide 60: L01XX09     mitefosine 
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61: L01XX11    estramustine 62: L01XX14     tretinoine       
63: L01XX17    topotecan  64: L01XX19     irinotecan 
65: (L01XX22   alitretinoine) 66: (L01XX23   mitotane) 
67: (L01XX25   bexarotene) 68: (L01XX27   arsentrioxid)  
69: L01XX32    bortezomib 70: L01XX33    celecoxib 
71: (L01XX35   anagrelid)  72: L02AA02    polyestradiolfosfat 
73: L02AB01    megestrol  74:L02AB02     medroxyprogesteron 
75: L02AE01    busereline  76: L02AE02    leuproreline 
77: L02AE03    gosereline  78: L02AE04    triptoreline 
79: L02BA01    tamoxifen  80: L02BA02    toremifen 
81: L02BA03    fulvestrant 82: L02BB01    flutamid 
83: L02BB03    bicalutamide 84: L02BG03    anastrozol 
85: L02BG04    letrozol  86: L02BG06    exemestan 
87: L03AA02    filgrastim  88: L03AA03    molgramostim 
89: L03AA10    lenograstim 90: L03AA13    pegfilgrastim 
91: L03AB01    interferon alfa natural 92:L03AB03     interfereon-gamma 
93: L03AB04    interferon alfa-2a 94: L03AB05    interferon alfa-2b  
95: (L03AB07  interferon-beta-1a) 96: L03AB08    interferon-beta-1b 
97: (L03AB09  interferon alfacon-1) 98: L03AB10    peginterferon alfa-2b 
99: L03AB11    peginterferon alfa-2a 100: L03AC01  aldesleucin 
101: L03AX03  BCG-vaccine 102: (L03AX11 tasonermin) 
103: L03AX13  glatirameracetat 104: L04AA01   cyclosporin 
105: L04AA02  muromonab-CD3 106: (L04AA04 antithymocyt-immunoglobulin) 
107: L04AA05  tacrolimus 108: L04AA06  mycofenolacid 
109: (L04AA08 daclizumab) 110: L04AA09  baciliximab 
111: L04AA10  sirolimus  112: L04AA11  etanercept 
113: L04AA12  infliximab  114: L04AA13   leflunomid  
115: L04AA14  anakinra  116: L04AA17   adalimumab 
117: L04AA18  everolimus 118: (L04AA21  efalizumab) 
119: (L04AA23 natalizumab) 120: L04AX01   azatioprin 
121: L04AX03  methotrexate tablets 
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APPENDIX 5.  Official wholesale price by rounds 
officialpr~e         102    352.7301     442.394       1.81       1890
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> round = 2006
                                                                                 
officialpr~e        1013    367.2945    527.2593        1.9       2960
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> round = 2005
                                                                                 
officialpr~e         771    260.4191    361.4364       1.52    1652.56
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> round = 2004
                                                                                 
officialpr~e         132    269.0521    553.4756       5.29    4255.15
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> round = 2003
                                                                                 
officialpr~e         537    274.7724     526.297       1.52    4255.15
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> round = 2002
                                                                                 
officialpr~e         718     206.108    454.4579       1.51    4961.54
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> round = 2001
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APPENDIX 6.  Official wholesale price by years 
officialpr~e         864    333.0494    475.4011       1.52       2960
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> year = 2007
                                                                                 
officialpr~e         762     330.415    479.8593       1.52       2960
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> year = 2006
                                                                                 
officialpr~e         505    269.7856    456.6969       1.52    4255.15
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> year = 2005
                                                                                 
officialpr~e         566     233.367    487.0836       1.51    4961.54
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> year = 2004
                                                                                 
officialpr~e         576    229.2114    483.2868       1.51    4961.54
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> year = 2003
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APPENDIX 7. Multiple regression full model 
. 
                                                                              
       _cons      22.6719   11.24972     2.02   0.044     .6144341    44.72938
_Imarket_121     17.57587    7.35669     2.39   0.017     3.151512    32.00024
_Imarket_120       13.468   5.603577     2.40   0.016     2.480993    24.45501
_Imarket_117    -13.80653   5.814906    -2.37   0.018     -25.2079   -2.405168
_Imarket_116     566.5642   7.644433    74.11   0.000     551.5756    581.5527
_Imarket_115     9.510096   4.665509     2.04   0.042     .3623684    18.65782
_Imarket_114    -15.69961   4.737683    -3.31   0.001    -24.98884   -6.410367
_Imarket_113     539.8991   8.198034    65.86   0.000     523.8251    555.9731
_Imarket_112     128.7263   5.097219    25.25   0.000     118.7321    138.7205
_Imarket_111     61.67123   43.16647     1.43   0.153    -22.96584    146.3083
_Imarket_110      1481.45   63.47325    23.34   0.000     1356.997    1605.903
_Imarket_108     6.328189    8.64019     0.73   0.464    -10.61275    23.26913
_Imarket_107     1.578843   11.85708     0.13   0.894    -21.66949    24.82718
_Imarket_105      409.932   5.706107    71.84   0.000      398.744    421.1201
_Imarket_104     33.22947   9.299147     3.57   0.000     14.99651    51.46244
_Imarket_103     9.657404   6.298713     1.53   0.125    -2.692568    22.00738
_Imarket_101     85.64432   5.072417    16.88   0.000     75.69876    95.58988
_Imarket_100     140.5135   8.937493    15.72   0.000     122.9896    158.0374
 _Imarket_99     186.2219   5.996147    31.06   0.000     174.4652    197.9786
 _Imarket_98     182.0432   6.961392    26.15   0.000     168.3939    195.6925
 _Imarket_96     40.82805   6.488917     6.29   0.000     28.10515    53.55096
 _Imarket_94     228.6126   30.34763     7.53   0.000     169.1096    288.1156
 _Imarket_93     28.92326   7.302915     3.96   0.000     14.60434    43.24219
 _Imarket_92     87.30348   6.298713    13.86   0.000     74.95351    99.65345
 _Imarket_91     8.610185   8.437005     1.02   0.308    -7.932365    25.15274
 _Imarket_90      902.487   27.51877    32.80   0.000     848.5305    956.4434
 _Imarket_89     21.48843   6.173142     3.48   0.001     9.384665    33.59219
 _Imarket_88     29.55319   8.437005     3.50   0.000     13.01064    46.09574
 _Imarket_87     66.24593   5.373673    12.33   0.000      55.7097    76.78217
 _Imarket_86    -17.21903   5.186947    -3.32   0.001    -27.38914   -7.048909
 _Imarket_85    -17.50794   5.050093    -3.47   0.001    -27.40972    -7.60615
 _Imarket_84    -13.59645   4.576175    -2.97   0.003    -22.56902   -4.623887
 _Imarket_83     17.08075   12.10207     1.41   0.158    -6.647941    40.80944
 _Imarket_82     6.398987   5.959252     1.07   0.283    -5.285398    18.08337
 _Imarket_81     400.9901   7.178433    55.86   0.000     386.9152    415.0649
 _Imarket_80    -18.64562   5.108819    -3.65   0.000    -28.66255   -8.628685
 _Imarket_79     29.71123   9.518904     3.12   0.002     11.04739    48.37508
 _Imarket_78     123.8643   8.380311    14.78   0.000     107.4329    140.2957
 _Imarket_77     149.9715   19.13368     7.84   0.000     112.4558    187.4872
 _Imarket_76     174.9242   12.32547    14.19   0.000     150.7575     199.091
 _Imarket_75     220.9451   37.47223     5.90   0.000     147.4728    294.4174
 _Imarket_74    -4.506601   3.899921    -1.16   0.248    -12.15323    3.140027
 _Imarket_73     -17.2195   5.328912    -3.23   0.001    -27.66797   -6.771029
 _Imarket_72    -11.29917   6.504353    -1.74   0.082    -24.05234    1.454007
 _Imarket_70    -15.18853   5.773351    -2.63   0.009    -26.50842   -3.868645
 _Imarket_69      1168.96   6.531274   178.98   0.000     1156.154    1181.766
 _Imarket_64     120.5806   8.945997    13.48   0.000       103.04    138.1211
 _Imarket_63     356.5003   6.026488    59.16   0.000     344.6841    368.3165
 _Imarket_62    -19.04171   5.323308    -3.58   0.000    -29.47919   -8.604222
 _Imarket_61    -7.641698   5.545498    -1.38   0.168    -18.51483    3.231436
 _Imarket_60     29.51375   26.19236     1.13   0.260    -21.84197    80.86948
 _Imarket_59     7.215386   6.134509     1.18   0.240     -4.81263     19.2434
 _Imarket_58     72.75231   6.465018    11.25   0.000     60.07627    85.42836
 _Imarket_57     38.76172   7.570612     5.12   0.000     23.91792    53.60552
 _Imarket_52      .754187    5.23434     0.14   0.885    -9.508854    11.01723
 _Imarket_50     62.47838   9.493875     6.58   0.000     43.86361    81.09315
 _Imarket_48      1226.02   5.703107   214.97   0.000     1214.838    1237.202
 _Imarket_46       853.73   168.6346     5.06   0.000     523.0859    1184.374
 _Imarket_44     2212.068   9.493875   233.00   0.000     2193.454    2230.683
 _Imarket_43     528.5248   5.017114   105.34   0.000     518.6877    538.3619
 _Imarket_42      649.473   4.872387   133.30   0.000     639.9197    659.0264
 _Imarket_41      898.898   103.8553     8.66   0.000     695.2676    1102.528
 _Imarket_40    -26.59542   9.493875    -2.80   0.005    -45.21019   -7.980652
 _Imarket_39     470.0055   61.09547     7.69   0.000     350.2148    589.7962
 _Imarket_38     64.53418   8.041444     8.03   0.000     48.76721    80.30114
 _Imarket_37     43.14044   7.136338     6.05   0.000     29.14813    57.13276
 _Imarket_36     70.95577    7.66559     9.26   0.000     55.92575     85.9858
 _Imarket_35     7.303628   4.870264     1.50   0.134    -2.245565    16.85282
 _Imarket_34     157.4201   8.017364    19.63   0.000     141.7003    173.1398
 _Imarket_33     95.08202   8.438304    11.27   0.000     78.53692    111.6271
 _Imarket_31     91.98434   13.01745     7.07   0.000     66.46084    117.5078
 _Imarket_30      170.327   6.463404    26.35   0.000     157.6541    182.9998
 _Imarket_29     232.3636   28.25523     8.22   0.000     176.9631     287.764
 _Imarket_28    -13.54132   5.367595    -2.52   0.012    -24.06563   -3.017001
 _Imarket_27     467.5754   45.30592    10.32   0.000     378.7435    556.4073
 _Imarket_26     428.9189   41.35066    10.37   0.000     347.8421    509.9957
 _Imarket_25     27.99851   7.039057     3.98   0.000     14.19694    41.80008
 _Imarket_24     62.67191   7.888224     7.94   0.000     47.20537    78.13846
 _Imarket_23     95.99172   7.501271    12.80   0.000     81.28388    110.6996
 _Imarket_22    -9.573982   7.470451    -1.28   0.200     -24.2214    5.073433
 _Imarket_21    -4.343982   7.511478    -0.58   0.563    -19.07184    10.38387
 _Imarket_19     -18.0369    5.01891    -3.59   0.000    -27.87755   -8.196257
 _Imarket_18     72.11157   10.23146     7.05   0.000      52.0506    92.17254
 _Imarket_17     -20.3475   5.799112    -3.51   0.000     -31.7179   -8.977103
 _Imarket_16    -15.01989   5.205096    -2.89   0.004     -25.2256   -4.814191
 _Imarket_15     90.34734   38.71136     2.33   0.020     14.44546    166.2492
 _Imarket_13      111.319   14.35518     7.75   0.000     83.17266    139.4654
 _Imarket_12      408.884   8.966984    45.60   0.000     391.3023    426.4656
 _Imarket_11      1195.15   21.21162    56.34   0.000      1153.56     1236.74
 _Imarket_10     162.7758   20.59466     7.90   0.000     122.3956     203.156
  _Imarket_9     59.10064    7.58196     7.79   0.000     44.23459    73.96669
  _Imarket_8    -2.998673   5.039472    -0.60   0.552    -12.87963    6.882288
  _Imarket_7     83.51028   13.80542     6.05   0.000     56.44181    110.5788
  _Imarket_6      35.7657   9.881009     3.62   0.000     16.39188    55.13953
  _Imarket_5     266.8835   6.298713    42.37   0.000     254.5335    279.2334
  _Imarket_4     5.804349   4.839984     1.20   0.231    -3.685474    15.29417
  _Imarket_3    -16.33717   6.484009    -2.52   0.012    -29.05045    -3.62388
  _Imarket_2    -17.22092   5.515752    -3.12   0.002    -28.03573   -6.406114
      round6    -3.123155   18.58662    -0.17   0.867    -39.56619    33.31988
      round5     4.849718   8.039524     0.60   0.546    -10.91349    20.61292
      round4     6.132702   7.770541     0.79   0.430    -9.103104    21.36851
      round3     4.236174   12.52507     0.34   0.735     -20.3219    28.79425
      round2     8.297261   11.10744     0.75   0.455    -13.48124    30.07576
    parallel    -17.11681   8.926013    -1.92   0.055    -34.61816    .3845474
     generic    -42.81266   12.91963    -3.31   0.001    -68.14435   -17.48096
        pool    -7.379982   9.044434    -0.82   0.415    -25.11353    10.35356
        comp    -3.215108   1.573627    -2.04   0.041     -6.30054   -.1296767
                                                                              
     utprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =   148.4
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6572
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F( 98,  3166) =       .
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    3273
i.market          _Imarket_1-121      (naturally coded; _Imarket_1 omitted)
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       _cons     .5490022   .1731222     3.17   0.002      .209559    .8884453
_Imarket_121    -1.948343   .2149888    -9.06   0.000    -2.369875   -1.526812
_Imarket_120    -2.723735   .1740125   -15.65   0.000    -3.064923   -2.382546
_Imarket_117     .3156148   .3219434     0.98   0.327     -.315624    .9468537
_Imarket_116     5.822828   .1674646    34.77   0.000     5.494478    6.151178
_Imarket_115     2.776955   .1662004    16.71   0.000     2.451084    3.102827
_Imarket_114     .0959269    .166118     0.58   0.564    -.2297829    .4216366
_Imarket_113     5.736894   .1667674    34.40   0.000     5.409911    6.063877
_Imarket_112     4.412679   .1673126    26.37   0.000     4.084627    4.740731
_Imarket_111     2.362445   .7550503     3.13   0.002     .8820073    3.842882
_Imarket_110     6.736914   .1726339    39.02   0.000     6.398429      7.0754
_Imarket_108     .5527678    .281966     1.96   0.050    -.0000867    1.105622
_Imarket_107     .8821751   .2530098     3.49   0.000     .3860953    1.378255
_Imarket_105     5.493664   .1661828    33.06   0.000     5.167828    5.819501
_Imarket_104     1.122934   .2499536     4.49   0.000     .6328468    1.613022
_Imarket_103     2.845195   .1677983    16.96   0.000      2.51619    3.174199
_Imarket_101     4.022472   .1665811    24.15   0.000     3.695854     4.34909
_Imarket_100     4.545752   .1716943    26.48   0.000     4.209108    4.882395
 _Imarket_99     4.750348   .1673665    28.38   0.000      4.42219    5.078505
 _Imarket_98     4.694692   .1681223    27.92   0.000     4.365052    5.024331
 _Imarket_96     3.561673   .1679031    21.21   0.000     3.232463    3.890883
 _Imarket_94     4.733127   .2220367    21.32   0.000     4.297777    5.168478
 _Imarket_93      3.09485   .1948641    15.88   0.000     2.712777    3.476923
 _Imarket_92     4.116298   .1677983    24.53   0.000     3.787294    4.445303
 _Imarket_91     2.465403   .1699408    14.51   0.000     2.132197    2.798608
 _Imarket_90     6.254345   .1693987    36.92   0.000     5.922202    6.586487
 _Imarket_89     3.010424   .1823117    16.51   0.000     2.652963    3.367885
 _Imarket_88     3.164718   .1699408    18.62   0.000     2.831513    3.497923
 _Imarket_87      3.79722   .1688434    22.49   0.000     3.466166    4.128274
 _Imarket_86     .8164883   .1662375     4.91   0.000     .4905442    1.142432
 _Imarket_85     .5514902    .165957     3.32   0.001      .226096    .8768844
 _Imarket_84     .5983239   .1722953     3.47   0.001     .2605023    .9361456
 _Imarket_83      1.37712   .1932406     7.13   0.000     .9982309     1.75601
 _Imarket_82    -.3663579   .1721609    -2.13   0.033    -.7039161   -.0287998
 _Imarket_81     5.499615   .1679031    32.75   0.000     5.170405    5.828825
 _Imarket_80    -.5928383   .1795624    -3.30   0.001    -.9449088   -.2407678
 _Imarket_79     -1.37333   .1885862    -7.28   0.000    -1.743093   -1.003566
 _Imarket_78      4.42108   .1703313    25.96   0.000     4.087109    4.755051
 _Imarket_77     4.291174   .1979912    21.67   0.000      3.90297    4.679378
 _Imarket_76     4.547531   .1847668    24.61   0.000     4.185256    4.909805
 _Imarket_75     4.591298   .2851835    16.10   0.000     4.032134    5.150461
 _Imarket_74    -.8838896    .207058    -4.27   0.000    -1.289871   -.4779081
 _Imarket_73     .0991114   .1669677     0.59   0.553    -.2282644    .4264872
 _Imarket_72     1.371368   .1712828     8.01   0.000     1.035531    1.707204
 _Imarket_70    -.0183468     .16793    -0.11   0.913    -.3476093    .3109158
 _Imarket_69     6.538416   .1687918    38.74   0.000     6.207464    6.869369
 _Imarket_64     4.204625   .1833165    22.94   0.000     3.845194    4.564056
 _Imarket_63     5.359013   .1655032    32.38   0.000     5.034508    5.683517
 _Imarket_62     .5507707    .169564     3.25   0.001     .2183042    .8832371
 _Imarket_61     .1796138   .1793529     1.00   0.317    -.1720459    .5312735
 _Imarket_60     2.775538    .545817     5.09   0.000     1.705347    3.845729
 _Imarket_59    -.8871646   .1719562    -5.16   0.000    -1.224322   -.5500077
 _Imarket_58     3.976133   .1662841    23.91   0.000     3.650098    4.302169
 _Imarket_57     3.503148   .1685312    20.79   0.000     3.172707     3.83359
 _Imarket_52     2.432797   .1660311    14.65   0.000     2.107258    2.758337
 _Imarket_50     3.943829   .1725499    22.86   0.000     3.605508     4.28215
 _Imarket_48     6.522092   .1695087    38.48   0.000     6.189733     6.85445
 _Imarket_46     6.007131   .2791808    21.52   0.000     5.459737    6.554524
 _Imarket_44     7.158067   .1725499    41.48   0.000     6.819746    7.496388
 _Imarket_43     5.735682   .1660132    34.55   0.000     5.410177    6.061186
 _Imarket_42     5.933788   .1655985    35.83   0.000     5.609097    6.258479
 _Imarket_41     5.956818   .2144515    27.78   0.000      5.53634    6.377295
 _Imarket_40    -.6326461   .1725499    -3.67   0.000     -.970967   -.2943252
 _Imarket_39     5.619912   .2114328    26.58   0.000     5.205352    6.034471
 _Imarket_38     3.074016   .1923069    15.98   0.000     2.696957    3.451075
 _Imarket_37     2.407701   .1914109    12.58   0.000     2.032399    2.783003
 _Imarket_36     3.618299   .1852053    19.54   0.000     3.255164    3.981433
 _Imarket_35     2.713176   .1655037    16.39   0.000     2.388671    3.037682
 _Imarket_34     4.515762    .175185    25.78   0.000     4.172274     4.85925
 _Imarket_33     4.003819   .1783473    22.45   0.000     3.654131    4.353507
 _Imarket_31     3.591277    .193342    18.57   0.000     3.212189    3.970365
 _Imarket_30      4.67803   .1670259    28.01   0.000      4.35054     5.00552
 _Imarket_29     3.725856   .2257314    16.51   0.000     3.283261    4.168451
 _Imarket_28     1.078624   .1659886     6.50   0.000     .7531683    1.404081
 _Imarket_27     5.348545   .1977223    27.05   0.000     4.960869    5.736222
 _Imarket_26     5.165955   .1936869    26.67   0.000     4.786191     5.54572
 _Imarket_25     2.227352   .1764503    12.62   0.000     1.881383     2.57332
 _Imarket_24     3.579247   .1937025    18.48   0.000     3.199452    3.959042
 _Imarket_23     4.167668   .1674295    24.89   0.000     3.839387    4.495949
 _Imarket_22     1.612612   .1986337     8.12   0.000     1.223149    2.002076
 _Imarket_21     2.113109   .1675522    12.61   0.000     1.784587    2.441631
 _Imarket_19     .1154081   .2067161     0.56   0.577    -.2899029    .5207191
 _Imarket_18      3.63986   .2021472    18.01   0.000     3.243507    4.036213
 _Imarket_17    -.3851919   .1665442    -2.31   0.021    -.7117374   -.0586464
 _Imarket_16     .8022244    .178217     4.50   0.000     .4527919    1.151657
 _Imarket_15     2.450903    .229638    10.67   0.000     2.000649    2.901157
 _Imarket_13     3.922419   .2223834    17.64   0.000     3.486389     4.35845
 _Imarket_12     5.633394   .1788687    31.49   0.000     5.282684    5.984104
 _Imarket_11     6.550422   .1699767    38.54   0.000     6.217146    6.883697
 _Imarket_10     4.595957   .1933348    23.77   0.000     4.216883    4.975032
  _Imarket_9     2.013297   .2109605     9.54   0.000     1.599664     2.42693
  _Imarket_8     2.067579   .1700733    12.16   0.000     1.734114    2.401044
  _Imarket_7     3.733865   .2256741    16.55   0.000     3.291382    4.176347
  _Imarket_6     2.236302   .1812036    12.34   0.000     1.881014     2.59159
  _Imarket_5     5.096131   .1677983    30.37   0.000     4.767126    5.425135
  _Imarket_4     2.496753   .1784428    13.99   0.000     2.146878    2.846628
  _Imarket_3     -1.86859   .1668835   -11.20   0.000    -2.195801   -1.541379
  _Imarket_2     -2.47191   .1658731   -14.90   0.000     -2.79714   -2.146681
      round6    -.1014128    .107018    -0.95   0.343    -.3112444    .1084188
      round5     .0069789   .0515939     0.14   0.892    -.0941819    .1081397
      round4     .0210173   .0547255     0.38   0.701    -.0862837    .1283183
      round3     .1528289   .1003592     1.52   0.128    -.0439468    .3496045
      round2     .0480527   .0674559     0.71   0.476    -.0842089    .1803143
    parallel    -.5980819   .1893299    -3.16   0.002    -.9693036   -.2268602
     generic    -.3550802   .0697608    -5.09   0.000    -.4918612   -.2182992
        pool     .0119793    .052639     0.23   0.820    -.0912307    .1151893
        comp     .0031214   .0079985     0.39   0.696    -.0125613    .0188041
                                                                              
   lnutprice        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .96424
                                                       R-squared     =  0.8393
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F( 98,  3166) =       .
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    3273
i.market          _Imarket_1-121      (naturally coded; _Imarket_1 omitted)
 
